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So this en#1 looks like a pseudo bird-eye view / god's eye view on a smaller en.

The caveat of projection and reality of non separation appears on the last sentence :

their own environment attributed to another living body

We could ask what such en#1 would be for a echolocating bat or a ribosome in a cell in the process of making a complex protein. The only access we have to these en#1 are our limited senses in which all other experiences (say for instance UV or infrared camera or ultrasound) are projected into. There is a human bias in such en#1 as noted in

They define the en factors. They do it in their own terms.

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This distinction between en#1 and en#2 reminds me of Heidegger's distinction between Present-at-hand (Vorhandenheit) and Ready-to-hand (Zuhandenheit). (And Gendlin recognizes his debt to Heidegger at the end of APM, pg 278).

With the present-at-hand one has ( in contrast to "ready-to-hand" ) an attitude like that of a scientist or theorist, of merely looking at or observing something. In seeing an entity as present-at-hand, the beholder is concerned only with the bare facts of a thing or a concept, as they are present and in order to theorize about it.

However, in almost all cases we are involved in the world in an ordinary, and more involved, way. We are usually doing things with a view to achieving something. ( In Gendlin's terms, we would say that something "is implied" ).

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And this resonate with what Deleuze says about Leibniz (1646-1716) monad of subjectivity which is close to Heidegger's clearing / Lichtung:

http://deleuzelectures.blogspot.co.uk/2007/02/on-leibniz.html?_sm_au_=isV8Q714FnDjtqsj

"notice that the minute perceptions of the unconscious are like differentials of consciousness, it's minute perceptions without consciousness.


For conscious perceptions, Leibniz uses another word: apperception.


Apperception, to perceive , is conscious perception, and minute perception is the differential of consciousness which is not given in consciousness. All individuals express the totality of the world obscurely and confusedly. So what distinguishes a point of view from another point of view? On the other hand, there is a small portion of the world that I express clearly and distinctly, and each subject, each individual has his/her own portion, but in what sense? In this very precise sense that this portion of the world that I express clearly and distinctly, all other subjects express it as well, but confusedly and obscurely.
What defines my point of view is like ***a kind of projector that***, in the buzz of the obscure and confused world, keeps a limited zone of clear and distinct expression. However stupid you may be, however insignificant we all may be, we have our own little thing, even the pure vermin has its little world: it does not express much clearly and distinctly, but it has its little portion."

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Other exmaple from Chapter 7A g) + also the notion of carrying forward !!

For example, Jane Goodall reports that a chimpanzee mother, hearing its wounded young one crying, will find it and pick it up. The mother responds to the young one's cries. Not only does she come and pick it up, but she also feels the behavior she is doing (the string of evev-cf which is a bcxt-cf). To the human observer it is obvious that she is upset and concerned. However, Jane Goodall observes the mother pressing the young one against her side as she carries it, and this despite the pain she is inflicting with her tight grip across where the young one is wounded. Now too there are cries from the young one, and facial expressions of pain, to which the human observer is responsive, but which the mother does not hear or see.


It is clear in this example, that the animal is not responsive to the many bodily looks and sounds which--to a human--are expressive. Rather, the animal responds with certain behaviors (and that means also with feeling in-behav) to just certain sounds, looks and movements. All the rest of the body's expressive looks and sounds are extra, they are there for us to see but they do not relevant anything from another animal.

(...)

So there are two kinds of animal body looks: a) those which are called "rituals" and do carry forward, do resume or obviate behavior sequences, and b) those which we humans notice but the animals do not. The first kind could involve a very large shift in how the body is, since they might relevant or obviate a complex behavior sequence.

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