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OWERRI, 1969


All through recorded history, armies, small and great have not only recorded victories but also disasters.  Military History buffs will recall great examples from antiquity such as the loss of an entire 50,000 strong Army by Cambyses II, the First Persian Ruler of Egypt near the Siwa Oasis circa 523 BC , the Roman military disasters at Trebia (218 BC), Lake Trasimene (217 BC) and Cannae (216 BC),  the thrashing of British General Charles MacCarthy during the First Ashanti War in 1824, British General Elphinstone’s retreat from Kabul in 1842, the charge of the Light Brigade at Balaclava in 1854, General Pickett’s charge at Gettysburg in 1863, American 7th Cavalry Commander George Custer’s last stand at the battle of the Little BigHorn in 1876, and General Charles George Gordon's death in 1885 at the hands of the Mahdi in Sudan, among others.

In more recent history, major military disasters also abound, as was the case with Arab armies during the Six-Day war of 1967 or the American Ranger debacle of October 1993 in Somalia.

During the Nigerian civil war, many disasters occurred (from the point of view of both sides).  According to then Colonel Oluleye, who was GSO (I) at the AHQ, from the federal point of view, in 1967 they included early reversals at Eha Amufu, the Biafran Midwest invasion, various abortive and disastrous federal attempts to take Onitsha via an assault river crossing, and the loss of previously captured ground like Oguede and Abalambie Coconut estate.  In 1968, there were catastrophes like the loss of numerous logistic vehicles at Abagana, reversals at Onne, Arochukwu, Esukpai, Aletu, Amaseri, Afam, Enugu-Aku, Ikot-Ekpene, Oguta, Umuahia (Operation OAU), Adazi and Imu-Ikwu.  In 1969, reversals and/or disaster befell federal troops at Otoro, Uzuakoli, Owerri, Obetete, Obokwe, Omoko, Umuakpu, Ozuzu, Elelele, Omo Nwa Ami, Ovom, and Ipo.

Numerous factors at strategic, operational and tactical levels can lead to disaster, including inept decision making, poor intelligence, mediocre command and lack of detailed staff work, not to mention ill-trained and equipped troops, weather and bad luck.  In his Book, “Military Blunders”, Saul David focused on five such factors. They are, namely, incompetent command (as was the case in 1942 with General Percival at Singapore); failure to plan for trouble (as was the case in 1944 at Arnhem during Montgomery’s Operation Market-Garden); interference by political leadership (as occurred in 1942/43 with the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad); misplaced confidence (as afflicted the French in 1954 at Dien Bien Phu); and sheer failure to perform (as was the case in 1943 with the American II Corps at Kasserine Pass).

However, one factor that has stood out most frequently in history is when an army or unit has its supply chain cut or threatened.  This is precisely what befell the beleaguered 16th Brigade under the valiant Lt. Col. E. A. Etuk of the 3rd Marine Commando Division under Colonel Benjamin A.M. Adekunle of the Nigerian Army at Owerri from January to April 1969 during the civil war.  More than any other, this single disastrous development directly led to the change of command of the 3rd Marine Commando. An Army HQ Operational Order to this effect was dated on May 9, 1969.  It was then publicly announced on May 12, 1969 that Colonel Olusegun Obasanjo had replaced Colonel Benjamin Adekunle as GOC 3 Marine Commando.   On May 16, 1969, Obasanjo physically took over the Division.

Crack Biafran troops of the 60th, 52nd, and 63rd Brigades, along with the 68th Commando Battalion detachment of the "S" Division, all under the 14 Infantry Division, led by Colonel Ogbugo Kalu carried out the Owerri pincer operation – which proved to be a huge boost to Biafran morale.  However, remnants of the badly mauled 16 Brigade of 3MCDO later miraculously slipped out of encirclement under the brilliant command and leadership in crisis of Col. Etuk – widely regarded by former Biafran commanders as the best Nigerian field commander of the war.  It was at Owerri that Major Ted Hamman, Etuk’s second-in-command, lost his life.

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OWERRI, 1969 -  PART 2

Background to the Siege of Owerri

The year 1968 opened up in earnest, continuing a pattern that had been set on September 2nd  1967 when Major General Yakubu Gowon declared “total war” against Biafra in response to the Biafran invasion of the Midwestern Region/State of Nigeria.   Up until that time, “Operation Unicord,“ as the federal “internal security” operation against the breakaway Biafra (Eastern region of Nigeria) was called, was described as “Police action.”  Increasingly violent shooting went on side by side with increasingly cynical talking.

As the war raged, various external actors sought ways to resolve various elements of the crisis in favor of one or the other of the contending forces.  These included the Commonwealth, World Council of Churches, Organization for African Unity, and various nations, among other state and non-state actors.  Both Nigeria and Biafra conducted a furious war to influence international opinion by various means. Both entities send delegations abroad for this purpose as well as to shop for weapons and ammunition. For example, former Eastern Region Premier Michael Okpara and former Nigerian President Nnamdi Azikiwe were roving Biafran ambassadors to some East African and Francophone countries.   In the wake of Azikiwe’s diplomatic offensive, Tanzania, Gabon, Ivory Coast and Zambia recognized Biafra.  Importantly, on August 1st, General de Gaulle of France openly acknowledged already ongoing support for Biafran self-determination.  But there were other pro-Biafran forces in the background.  Biafra also sought and got support (of varying quantity and quality) from Israel, Portugal, Rhodesia, South Africa, the Vatican and non-state actors like Joint Church Aid, Holy Ghost Fathers of Ireland, Caritas International, MarkPress, US Catholic Relief Services, etc.

Meanwhile, federal delegations visited many other African countries to stem the tide of Biafran recognition and obtain official OAU backing, considerably enhanced by the sympathy of the OAU Consultative Committee on the Nigerian crisis.  (The members of this committee, led by Emperor Selassie of Ethiopia were Cameroun, Congo Kinshasha, Ghana, Liberia and Niger).  At the same time Nigeria was negotiating with countries like Belgium, the United Kingdom, Netherlands, Italy, West Germany, Hong Kong, Spain, Poland, the USSR, and the United States for weapons and other items of military ordnance. In August, for example, Dr, Okoi Arikpo was dispatched to the USSR on what was described as a goodwill visit coming exactly one year after a “cultural pact” between both countries – negotiated by Soviet Ambassador Alexandr Romanov - had resulted in the supply of Mig-17 fighter aircraft to Nigeria.   The Nigerian international shopping list in 1968 included Artillery, Armoured fighting vehicles, shells, battle rifles, rifle ammunition, machine guns, side arms, etc.  In the background, peace talks were stuttering in London, Kampala, Niamey, and Addis Ababa, as international concern increased about relief for civilians caught in the fighting.

On the battlefield, however, facts were being created and recreated on the ground and in propaganda.  In March, Onitsha finally fell to federal troops of the 2nd Infantry Division, after many bloody unsuccessful attempts.  In April, Abakaliki was captured, followed in May by the fall of Port Harcourt to troops of the 3rd Marine Commando Division.  On July 30th, an increasingly confident Colonel Benjamin Adekunle, GOC of the 3rd Marine Commando Division announced to the Press that he would capture Owerri, Aba and Umuahia (O.A.U) within two weeks. Nevertheless, it was not until August 15th, 1968, that Major General Gowon announced that the “final offensive” which would bring the war to an end would begin on August 25th.  Following this announcement, Aba fell to federal forces on September 4th followed on September 16th by Owerri.  But by the time Okigwe was taken on October 1st, it was evident that all was not well with the “final offensive.”

For quite some time, federal radio reports notwithstanding, it had not been all losses for the Biafran Army.  In April, Biafran troops overran federal units at Onne, Arochukwu, and Aletu, followed in May by another of the many recaptures of Afam Power Station.  This pattern was to continue when Ikot-Ekpene, Oguta and Enugu-Aku were seized from federal troops in September and Colonel Adekunle’s Operation “OAU” ended in calamity near Umuahia in October.  In fact, unknown to the public, the scale of the loss was such that the 3rd Marine Commando Division was reduced to one-third of its original 35,000 man size before Operation OAU!  By November, Owerri’s line of communication was being threatened, and as Colonel Oluleye put it, the 3rd Marine Commando Division was “reeling back to east and south.”  Interesting reports surfaced in the international Press that the federal “final offensive” was being stoutly resisted by Biafran troops, courtesy of French weapons and ammunition.

Indeed, the French operation, beginning in September 1968 and directed by M. Jacques Foccart was code-named “Operation Mabel”.  Foccart was the Secretary-General of the Franco-African Community.  In collaboration with the French Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs, he used Ivory Coast, Gabon, and Sao Tome as staging and resupply points for gun running to Biafra with the full connivance of the French Secret Service.  However, following aggressive diplomatic representations from Nigeria, Fernando Po  (now called Equatorial Guinea), and Cameroun refused to cooperate with Foccart. Indeed, none of Nigeria’s Francophone neighbors – Benin, Cameroun, Chad, and Niger – supported Biafra.

But it would be simplistic to think that it was all about French weapons and ammunition.  Long before General de Gaulle publicly declared support for Biafra and began sending in large consignments of weapons, the federal Army had already begun betraying bad habits that would eventually be brilliantly exploited by cunning Biafran commanders and determined Biafran troops thoroughly familiar with the ground.     First was the sheer size of the area of responsibility allocated to the 3rd Marine Commando, for example.  They were stretched across a vast area of jungle and riverain creeks called the “southern front” extending 150 miles from the Orashi river through Owerri, Aba and Ikot Ekpene to Itu along the Cross-River.  The second factor was the federal tendency to rely on main roads for advance.  The third was the notorious tendency (particularly among units of the 2nd and 3rd Divisions) to rush in to seize objectives without securing and vigorously patrolling lines of communication and flanks.  The 2nd Division took Onitsha like that with no contingency for securing control of the Onitsha-Enugu road.  During the 3rd CDO Division dash to Umuahia, no effort was made to secure lines of communication either.   To amply this dangerous tendency, fourthly, federal battalions, brigades and divisions rarely acted in coordination and GOCs often-disobeyed higher command from Lagos.  Fifthly, the many hastily recruited and trained federal troops, although initially enthusiastic, were unfamiliar with the ground and superstitious about darkness, making nighttime operations highly unattractive, for fear of “juju”.  Lastly, such daytime operations as were carried out, again, particularly in the 2nd and 3rd Divisions, were characterized by heavy expenditure of ammunition and poor fire discipline.  The sheer volume of fire they could deliver ‘at anything that moved’, was the basic source of motivation for the average federal soldier as he carried out “clearing operations.”   Junior tactical level leadership was seriously lacking outside the 1st Division, which had the benefit of retaining the core of the old Nigerian Army.   Planners, for example, projected 5 million rounds of ammunition for the 3rd Marine Commando Division alone at the beginning of Operation OAU in 1968.  But even more startling, in planning for offensives after May 1969, the AHQ projected a minimum of about 15 million rounds of 7.62-mm rifle ammunition for each division, supplemented by another 15 million rounds held in reserve in Lagos.  All of this was to be purchased from the USSR, Spain and the UK.  In other words, enough ammunition to kill the entire 60 million strong population of the country at that time!  This does not include Mortar and Artillery shells,  etc.    This “ammunition mentality” was amplified by reassurances that Biafran soldiers were unarmed or poorly armed.  But as federal casualties mounted and it became apparent that Biafran soldiers could also be well armed (albeit only from time to time), federal soldiers became increasingly reluctant to take risks on patrol – unless numerical and firepower advantage were overwhelming.

To these ‘bad federal habits’ must be added certain “good habits” and advantages of the Biafran soldier.  The first was that they were very highly motivated and determined, fighting on home ground.  To federal troops the battlefields might have been little more than places on maps and abstract names of hamlets, villages, and towns populated by misguided civilians.  To Biafran troops they represented the safe haven of ancestral lands held by generations of their people, homes, farms, burial grounds, places of ritual significance etc.   The role of such motivation became increasingly apparent as federal divisions crossed from the usually pro-federal or neutral minority areas of the eastern region into the core Igbo areas whose fear of “genocide”, dating back to the events of July – September 1966, was constantly reinforced by Biafran radio. Biafra clearly had the edge in psychological warfare.    The second was the enterprising and recurrent ability of Biafran units and sub-units to penetrate federal lines, sometimes even operating far in the rear of supposedly captured federal areas – where they could rely on a sympathetic population.   The third was the ability of some Biafran commanders to resourcefully exploit the natural terrain in defensive positions (including concrete bunkers) well connected by all-weather communication trenches.  Such defensive positions were often set up to cover strategic roads and demolished bridges as well as any lines of federal retreat from pre-positioned Biafran home-made minefields.  The problem, though, was that the defensive positions were often not deployed in depth, and Biafran soldiers were chronically short of weapons and ammunition, inspite of heroic scientific efforts to produce their own.

Double Envelopment at Owerri

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OWERRI, 1969 - PART 3


DOUBLE ENVELOPMENT AT OWERRI


Carl von Clausewitz once wrote that "Tactics is the art of using troops in battle; strategy is the art of using battles to win the war."



Indeed, over the centuries, military theorists and practitioners have sought to develop and implement principles of war, as well as the tactical and strategic maneuvers essential to victory. It is not uncommon to hear military theorists describe the bedrock of warfare as consisting of (a) the identification of an objective, (b) taking the offensive, (c) retaining the element of surprise, including stealth and deception, (d) maintaining operational security and force protection, (e) ensuring unity of command, (f) efficient and economical use of force, (g) concentration of superior force(s) at the decisive point(s), also known as the principle of mass, and last but not the least, (h) the deployment of forces through maneuver, to ensure retaining all the hitherto mentioned advantages of offense, surprise, security (protection), unity of command, economy of force, and mass. To these core principles others have suggested subsidiary but no less important principles, like administration. And to the long list of “principles” must be factored such imponderables like luck, style of command, quality of intelligence, and timeliness of response to good intelligence.



Nevertheless, it seems apparent that the mechanics of offensive maneuver are essential to eventual attainment of military objectives, no matter the era of warfare. Such maneuvers include (a) Frontal assault by penetration of the center (i.e. “Head-on collision”) or breaking through gaps between enemy units, (b) single envelopment, (c) double envelopment, (d) defensive-offensive feints, (e) turning movements, (f) hot pursuit, (g) Razzia /Hornet's Tactic, etc.



Enveloping maneuvers seek to surround (envelope) the enemy using ground troops, airborne or amphibious forces. In single envelopment, the maneuver, using ground troops, is directed against one enemy flank or around one enemy flank to attack the rear. In double envelopment, two attacking groups of ground troops swing around the flanks of the enemy position either to attack the flanks directly or destroy targets in the rear primarily to disrupt communications or retreat, while a secondary or diversionary group attacks the enemy from the front. In vertical envelopment, airborne troops are dropped behind enemy lines to seize important targets, disrupt coordination and communications, and/or prevent retreat. In amphibious envelopment, the same objectives are attained using amphibious (sea or river borne) forces.



One way to illustrate the concept of single envelopment is to think of one's hands. If, standing in front of a hypothetical enemy, one were to swing an outstretched upper arm, forearm and hand (left or right) to grab him (or her) from behind and pull him (or her) in closer for the coup de Grace, one would have single enveloped the enemy. If both upper limbs are used to swing around and bring him (or her) into a bear hug, one would have double enveloped the enemy. Double envelopment is also called "pincer movement" because of the shape of a pincer.



Single envelopment was used by Alexander the Great during the battle of Arbela in 331 BC. US Confederate Generals Robert Lee and “Stonewall” Jackson also employed it successfully at the battle of Chancellorsville in 1863. In his quest to evict the British Eight Army from Libya and capture the strategic port of Tobruk, German General Erwin Rommel swung the powerful 15th Panzer Division, supported by Italian infantry around Bir el Harmat on June 12th, 1942, attacking the British from the side and rear, causing considerable chaos and eventual defeat. To this short but by no means exclusive list of fascinating historical examples one should add the first Persian Gulf War of 1991, during which American General Norman Schwarzkopf used the principle of single envelopment to outflank Iraqi forces in Kuwait.



On the other hand, the first recorded use in military history of the principle of "double envelopment" was at the Battle of Cannae, on August 2nd, 216 BC, between Carthaginian troops under Hannibal and Roman troops under Consul Terentius Varro. The superior Roman Army of 79,000 men was routed and destroyed by 50,000 men under Hannibal whose backs were against the sea. A similar principle was used in 1781 at Cowpens during the American Revolutionary War against Britain. During the Second World War, the 7th German Army was double enveloped in August 1944 at the Argentan-Falaise Gap by the US Fifth Armored Division, supported by Canadian, British and Polish forces. The failure to completely close the Argentan-Falaise gap has been ascribed to a controversial decision made by Lt. Gen. Omar Bradley, then commanding the 12th U.S. Army Group. He stopped the link-up of the XV Corps of Lt. Gen. George S. Patton's Third Army with Lt. Gen. Henry D. G. Crerar's First Canadian Army moving south from Caen toward Falaise for fear of accidental friendly fire, among other reasons. Through the gap thus created, many beleaguered German units escaped.





The fall of Owerri in 1968 and the creation of the Owerri salient
The initial assault and capture of the strategic town of Owerri – which was then in part the capital of Biafra - was conceptualized in 1968 by Colonel Benjamin Adekunle (aka “Black Scorpion”) along three axes assigned to the 14th, 15th and 16th Brigades of the 3MCDO, under Majors George Innih, Yemi Alabi (later Makanjuola) and E.A. Etuk, respectively. Etuk had previously been the successful Commanding Officer of the 8th Battalion along the Calabar-Itu-Ikot Ekpene axis before being redeployed to his new Brigade command for the push into Port Harcourt and dash to Owerri.






Supported by mortars and artillery, Captain Isemede’s 12 Bde was to protect the left flank of Major Shande’s 17 Bde as he crossed the Imo River, ultimately taking the market town of Aba on September 4th. Meanwhile, Etuk’s 16 Bde was to charge head on from Port-Harcourt in a ‘penetration of the center’ toward Owerri. Innih’s 14th Bde was to protect Etuk’s right flank by advancing on to Owerrinta (between Etuk and Isemede) while Makanjuola’s 15th Bde was to swing left of Owerri, bypassing Ohoba in an ambitious river-borne assault on Oguta. From here they hoped to simultaneously threaten Biafra’s connection to the outside world at Uli-Ihiala airstrip six miles away, cut off Biafra’s source of fuel at the Egbema oil field, and prevent Biafran reinforcements from reaching Owerri. Innih and Isemede would then swing north and left and later link up with Makanjuola, north of Owerri, securing the position of Etuk inside Owerri, effectively ending the war. Unfortunately, as is so often the case in war, the plan did not survive contact with opposing Biafran forces.



Led by its 33rd Battalion, supported by armoured vehicles, mortars and artillery, the 16th Bde pushed into Owerri on September 16, a day after Makanjuola had to abandon his position at Oguta with heavy losses in the face of fierce Biafran counter-attacks led by Colonel Nwajei, Captain Anuku and Colonel Joe Achuzia. Major Asoya subsequently dislodged Federal units of the 15th Bde from the Egbema oil field. Etuk, meanwhile, had advanced furiously against units of the Biafran 14th Division (then under Colonel Nwajei) from Port-Harcourt, through Elele, Awarra, Asa, Ohoba, Avu, Obinze, and finally to Owerri itself. Although unintended, what Colonel Nwajei achieved by default in failing to stop Etuk’s advance (allegedly due to lack of ammunition) was to “retreat his base”, thus setting Etuk up for the kill as the Biafran flanks on either side of Owerri moved forward against Innih and Makanjuola. Nevertheless, Biafran leader Ojukwu replaced Nwajei, now suspected of “sabotage”, as commander of the 14th Division. Colonel Ogbugo Kalu, a one time Commandant of the Nigerian Military Training College, who had earlier been branded a “saboteur” after the fall of Port Harcourt, took Nwajei’s place.



On Etuk’s right flank, Innih’s push against the Biafran 63 Bde to Inyiogugu, along the Owerri-Umuahia road, north of Owerrinta, was bogged down one mile to Inyiogugu. Counter-attacks by Biafran commandos against Innih’s units were led initially by the mercenary, Colonel Steiner (until he fell out with his hosts), and later the reinvigorated 63 Bde under Major Lambert Ihenacho along with a battalion from the new “S” division led by Colonel Onwuategwu. (The “S” Division had been created after the fall of Aba). During the battle for Inyiogugu, Biafran home made “Ogbunigwe” mines were used with devastating effect and French weapons began to arrive in increasing quantity. The 14th Bde fell back southwards in disarray all the way to Elelem and Amala.



For a full twenty-one (21) days, the 16th Bde, now dug in inside Owerri, could not make any contact with nor get information about the 14th and 15th Bdes on either side of it. As noted above, the two sister brigades were supposed to protect its flanks and prevent Biafran counter-attacks. Instead they were concerned with their own very survival at that point, retreating in chaos, thus exposing the 16th to an uncertain fate inside the Owerri salient in the absence of an outright order to evacuate. Nevertheless, Etuk tried to relieve pressure on his sister brigades by attempting to use his momentum to puncture the outstretched Biafran base and create an opening to attack Biafran forces on his left and right from the rear. He did this by



1. Pushing along the Owerri-Okigwe road toward Mbieri and Orodo aiming at Orlu and Nkwerre.



2. Pushing along the Ihiala road and exploiting beyond Ogbaku toward Oguta.



Both of these moves were cut short by Biafran reinforcements but served the purpose of temporarily stabilizing the situation of what was left of the 14th and 15th brigades. Etuk’s moves were indirectly assisted by the assault from the north on Okigwe by elements of the First Division under Colonel Shuwa. This initially served to distract Biafran efforts to contain Etuk.



However, reserve troops from the 13th and 18th Brigades of the 3MCDO under Majors Tuoyo and Aliyu that might otherwise have been available to secure the Owerri situation and stiffen the assault on Oguta and ultimately Uli-Ihiala airstrip were diverted on a suicidal mission to take Umuahia by the GOC, Colonel Adekunle, against orders from AHQ. According to Major General Oluleye (rtd), this troop diversion was done with the tacit support of the Head of State, Major General Gowon (for details, see forthcoming essay about “Operation OAU”).



Nevertheless, during a wartime visit to Port Harcourt, the C-in-C, Major General Gowon encouraged the 16th Brigade Commander by radio to sit tight and hold Owerri until relieved. Like the German 6th Army at Stalingrad, the 16th Bde was ordered to “hedgehog.” (The hedgehog is a 6 – 9 inch long mammal with white hair on its stomach and the hair on its back modified into spines. Using the large muscle running along its stomach it can pull its body into a compact, spiky ball for defense purposes).



The 44th battalion of the 16th Bde then secured the Owerri-Aba and Owerri-Umuahia roads out to 12 kilometers. The 33rd Bn secured the Owerri-Okigwe, Owerri-Orlu and Owerri-Enugu roads, while the 2nd Bn was stretched out securing the western approaches to the town from Ohoba and Oguta. The 11 kilometer radius away from the Owerri city center of the defensive lines of responsibility allotted to the various battalions of the Brigade was allegedly influenced by knowledge of the range (or lack thereof) of Biafran artillery. If true, it was an odd decision, considering that Biafra had a few 105-mm Artillery pieces in its inventory and Etuk’s troops in the city center were clearly within sniper range, as will be apparent later in the essay. It is more likely that actual defensive positions were functionally related to the seriousness of Biafran pressure in various sectors. Importantly, though, supply and communication routes from Port-Harcourt were barely protected. Meanwhile, Biafran troops were slowly but gradually ensnaring the brigade in a noose, all the while monitoring federal radio communications.



On each side of the 16th Brigade, Biafran troops had successfully rolled back federal troops of Innih’s 14th Bde to Amafor and Makanjuola’s 15th Bde to Ebocha bridge, while sparing Etuk too much pressure along the direct northern approaches to Owerri. Etuk – on orders from Adekunle and Gowon - would not withdraw to straighten the Divisional line, nor did he have the resources to break out in force to attack the flanking Biafran positions from the rear. Nor, with limitations imposed by Adekunle’s disaster at Umuahia, was there any relieving federal assault column aimed at Owerri towards which he could fight his way out, as Von Manstein had tried to convince Von Paulus to do at Stalingrad, countermanding Hitler’s orders. The 16th Bde rolled into a spiky ball, like a Hedgehog, and waited for relief as ordered.



Thus, the wily Commander of the Biafran Army, Major General Alexander Madiebo, one time coursemate to Major General Gowon at Sandhurst, was presented with an irresistible opportunity to complete a classic double envelopment of the soon to be beleaguered 16th Bde. He accepted the invitation with humility and threw two arms of the Biafran Army around to the rear of the Brigade in a killer Bear Hug aimed at closing the gap along the Owerri-Port Harcourt road.

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OWERRI, 1969 - PART 4



Cutting off the 16th Bde in order to kill it



The Political and strategic context



Following the fall of Port Harcourt to federal troops of the 3MCDO on May 19th, there was an urgent need for the Biafran separatist government to establish another airport through which weapons could be flown in. Thus, on the main road from Owerri to Ihiala, the long straight stretch between Mgbidi and Uli was widened to 25 meters and modified into a 2,600-meter long runway, along with a parallel taxi-way. This airstrip, capable of handling up to 30 large aircraft every night, code-named “Annabelle”, but better known as the Uli-Ihiala airport, became operational in August 1968 and would later assume a mythic stature in the story of the Nigerian Civil War (for details, see future essay on the Uli-Ihiala Airport). Meanwhile, Major General Emeka Ojukwu was exhorting Biafrans to resort to guerrilla warfare in a fight to the finish. He was quoted as saying:



“We shall all have to return to our provinces and villages. We shall turn out and harass the enemy at every turn and chase him out of our land.”



Indeed the Biafran delegation to the peace talks in Kampala walked out on May 31st, 1968. In support of Ojukwu’s position, another unnamed Biafran officer told the British journalist, John de St. Jorre,



“If you gave us the choice of 1000 rifles or milk for 50,000 starving children, we’d take the guns.”



Set against this apparent determination to continue fighting, it was through the Uli airstrip that the first large consignment of French weapons to Biafra began arriving in late August, consisting of 2000 rockets and millions of rounds of ammunition delivered serially in 20-ton aliquots of ordnance every night. This occurred shortly after Czechoslovakia, Holland, Italy, France and Belgium banned arms sales to Nigeria, hoping to force the pugilists to the peace table and prevent further fratricide. At this time, an average of 10,000 men, women and children were reportedly dying every day in Biafra, mostly from starvation. The Nordchurchaid relief airlift operation to Biafra had only just begun even as Robert Goldstein, Public Relations Representative of Biafra in the USA was resigning. He was protesting Ojukwu’s rejection of land routes through Federal and Biafran territory as a means of getting urgent relief shipments to starving civilians. Ojukwu had laid down a condition that not only would he not accept mercy land corridors for food aid (supervised by the International Red Cross, World Council of Churches etc) without a complete ceasefire, but that an airlift was the only solution to feed the starving. What Ojukwu wanted was a mechanism by which food aid could be used as a cover for weapons imports (particularly at night) without the prying eyes of the Federal Government. Hence the preference for airlifts over road haulage even if it meant blocking emergency shipments of food already waiting at Nigerian ports.



The situation in Biafra in September 1968 was, therefore, very fluid. On one hand, the French had started making good on promises to supply weapons and ammunition. But international pressure to reach an accommodation with Nigeria to protect starving civilians was continuing. At the OAU meeting that took place in Algiers on September 13th, Nigeria won a diplomatic victory when the continental body passed a pro-Nigerian resolution basically declaring its opposition to secession.



The Biafran delegation to the meeting, consisting of recognized figures like Nnamdi Azikiwe, Michael Okpara, Kenneth Dike, Francis Nwokedi and others subsequently conducted a crucial meeting with the French observer delegation from Foccart’s office. They wanted France to agree to an unrestrained military commitment to Biafra, in which enough weapons to assure victory over Nigeria, would be supplied, rather than just enough to defend the core of Biafra against Nigeria’s “Operation Tall Man”, Gowon’s final offensive of 1968. The French delegation refused, and stipulated that they would not increase the current level of commitment unless Biafra was able to independently attract additional diplomatic recognition from more African countries. It was a Catch-22 situation.



It was on this basis, therefore, that the Biafran OAU observer delegation in Algiers (except Nwokedi, who dissented) sent a cable back to Emeka Ojukwu in Biafra. They advised that in view of the recent fall of Aba and Owerri, and French ambivalence, Biafra – faced with large numbers of starving people - should negotiate a peaceful end to the crisis by responding to Nigeria’s offer of guarantees and re-integration of Igbos. Ojukwu’s reaction, however, was to accuse them all of treason and order the delegation to return home at once. This was the point at which Ojukwu parted ways with long-standing Igbo politicians like Azikiwe and Okpara. A follow-up letter sent from Paris on September 25th by Nnamdi Azikiwe to persuade Ojukwu to negotiate – in order to save lives - was also rebuffed. A few days later, on September 27th, to outflank the old political warhorse, Ojukwu convened his appointed Biafran Consultative Assembly and got a “mandate” to keep fighting.



A week earlier, on September 24, the International Military Observer Team in Nigeria (OTN) had started work, invited by Major General Gowon of Nigeria, to evaluate whether Nigerian troops were indeed committing genocide. The Team consisted of General Negga Tegegne of Ethiopia, Major Slimane Hoffman of Algeria, Colonel Alfons Olkiewicz of Poland, along with Major Generals Arthur Raab, Henry Alexander and W.A. Milroy of Sweden, UK and Canada, respectively. Brigadier Sir Bernard Fergusson later took General Alexander’s place. On October 2nd, 1968, a day after Okigwe was taken by elements of the 1st Division to coincide with Nigeria’s independence anniversary, the OTN published its first interim report.





The Biafran Army takes the Offensive



Thus armed with a fresh “mandate” to continue fighting and awash with new weapons from France, the Biafran Army began its counter-offensive. It is important, however, to note that the apparent large consignments of french weapons were not without problems. Quite often the wide variety of ammunition delivered would not match available weapons.



Nevertheless, the successful campaign to retake Oguta and Egbema oil fields, push federal troops back from Inyiogugu to Amafor on the left, and from Egbema to Ebocha bridge on the right flank of Owerri forced the 16th Brigade to deploy widely to protect its flanks. This stretched it out considerably, increasing its vulnerability.



Taking note of the caveat that Biafran ‘Brigades’ had no more than 1000 men each, the following Biafran units were deployed around the Owerri salient:

The 60 Brigade under Colonel Asoya, between Owerri-Ihiala and Owerri-Port Harcourt roads.

The 52 Brigade, under Colonel Chris Ugokwe, between the Owerri-Ihiala and Owerri-Umuahia roads.

The Third Brigade of Colonel Ogbugo Kalu’s 14 Division, between the Owerri-Ihiala and Owerri-Umuahia roads.

The 63 Brigade under Colonel Lambert Ihenacho, between the Owerri-Umuahia road and the Imo River.

The 68 Battalion detachment from the “S” Division, under Major Ikeji, flexibly based at Emekuku, near Owerri in support of 14 Division.

According to former Biafran Army Commander, Major General Madiebo,



“The task of surrounding Owerri and gradually destroying the enemy inside it was going to be a gigantic one, and would take a very long time, considering the fact that ammunition supply to the troops was normally small and most irregular. For that reason, the whole operation was divided into three major phases.



The aim of the first phase was to box in the enemy on all sides as much as possible into Owerri town, and sever all his routes to the rear except for the Owerri-Port Harcourt main road. It was necessary to leave that major line of communication open for the enemy, otherwise we would scare him too soon, and compel him to take necessary precautions before we were fully prepared to deal the final blow. For that phase, 52 Brigade was to push enemy back in all its areas of responsibility to within one mile from Owerri. Its special tasks during that phase were to clear Egbu, Orji and Orogwe. 60 Brigade was to clear all areas right of Port Harcourt-Owerri road and then maintain a strong defensive line all along the side of that road from Irete on their left to Umuakpu on their right. In addition, the Brigade was to deny the enemy the use of Elele-Umudiogu-Ubimi road, thereafter. The 68 Battalion of “S” Division had the task of moving through the left flank of 63 Brigade to clear all areas held by the enemy on the left side of Port Harcourt-Owerri road between Naze and Umuakpu. The 63 Brigade was to remain in its defensive positions but prepared to provide reinforcements for places where they were needed for exploring success.


On the successful completion of the first phase, we expected to see enemy concentrate heavily inside Owerri town, and thereafter having as his only link to the rear the main Port Harcourt road. On our side, we expected to find our troops who were widely dispersed in defensive locations, better concentrated and in a position to operate more effectively. If and when that happened, it would then be the signal for the beginning of the second phase of the operation.



In the second phase, the sole aim was to move swiftly in strength with all that was available and seize the Port Harcourt road between Avu and Umuakpu, and thus seal off Owerri. During that phase 60 Brigade was to move to take Obinze and Avu and link up both towns and exploit southwards to Mgbirichi where they would join up with 68 Battalion elements. The 68 Battalion itself was expected to seize the thinly defended towns of Umuakpu and Umuagwo and, having linked them up, was to move northwards to Mgbirichi to make contact with 60 Brigade. It was clearly obvious that if the second phase was successful the reaction of the enemy inside Owerri would be very violent indeed. For that reason, the task of 52 Brigade during that phase was merely to prepare troops to beat back enemy counterattacks both in 60 Brigade and 68 Battalion areas.



The third and final phase of the operation was to descend on the encircled enemy inside Owerri and destroy him while preventing him from breaking through southwards. For the final phase, the 60 Brigade was to clear the right half of the town up to the clock tower. The 52 Brigade was to tackle the left side of the town while the 68 Battalion was to defend the Port Harcourt-Owerri road and flanks right and left of it.”

OFFLINE

OWERRI, 1969 - PART 5

The Plot Thickens
Although assisted by heavy rains, poor federal logistics and coordination along with overextended lines of communications, Madiebo’s plan for the encirclement of Owerri was by no means a lightning strike. Because of the relatively limited combat resources available to him, it was designed to be a slow process – aided no doubt by federal ineptitude. To facilitate Biafran troop support during this ambitious scheme, soldiers were expected to live off the land, harvesting what they could lay their hands on to supplement provisions from the Biafran Food Directorate. Careful preparations were made even as other developments favorable to Biafra were occurring elsewhere. In the last two weeks of September, for example, Colonel Adekunle, in an effort to get there before Colonel Shuwa’s 1st Division, and at the same time present Major General Gowon with an Independence day present, made a disastrous effort to capture Umuahia. He lost the equivalent of four or more battalions in the process, trapped and destroyed as a result of insecure lines of communication and supply. By mid-October advance Biafran units were within five miles of Aba, probing along the Umuahia-Aba road. This was when the proposal to change Colonel Adekunle as GOC, 3MCDO and/or split the division into two was first broached with Major General Gowon, who initially refused the recommendation of AHQ partly for political reasons. Thus, Adekunle felt vindicated and made no efforts to adjust his tactics in light of the terrible experience at Umuahia. The stage was thus set for the Owerri disaster.

The 3MCDO Division had previously been reorganized after the initial fall of Aba and Owerri. Brigades were grouped into four (4) sectors. The 15 and 16 Brigades in the Oguta-Owerri axis comprised Sector 1 under Col. Godwin Ally, who had transferred to the 3MCDO from the 2nd Division where he had commanded the 7 Brigade at Asaba. The 14 and 17 Brigades were grouped in Sector 2 under Lt. Col. Alani Akinrinade – another former Brigade Commander in the 2nd Division who left that division after clashing with Colonel Mohammed over the Onitsha debacle and had himself experienced a disaster at Onne. The 12, 13 and 18 Brigades - all badly mauled at Umuahia - were in Sector 3 under Lt. Col. Alabi-Isama. Lastly, a Sector was created in Calabar for rear administrative purposes. It was under the command of Lt. Col. Ayo-Ariyo.

While Major General Gowon was distracted by rear internal security dilemmas like the Omopupa and Agbekoya “anti-tax” riots in the West, repositioning and battlefield preparation for the first phase of Madiebo’s master plan to surround Owerri was being implemented gradually but surely. The first sign of trouble detected by then Lt. Col. Etuk was when he observed that whenever he sent his quarter-master (QM) from Owerri back to Sector and Divisional HQ at Port Harcourt for supplies, the QM would often be ambushed and his supplies retrieved by small Biafran patrols.

According to Col Etuk (rtd),

“Each time he was coming back he would be ambushed. At times he escaped and a lot of goodies he collected from them would be shared by the rebels and the balance he would bring to me. So I reported back to my Divisional Commander, Adekunle. He didn’t take the matter seriously and this continued until when supplies were no longer coming. I couldn’t communicate with the outside since the battery of my radio was dead. I couldn’t talk to anybody.”

By November 1st, Etuk’s second-in-command, Major AT Hamman, who was leading those elements of the federal 16th Bde responsible for protecting its southern flank, was already filing radio reports saying his line of communication was threatened. In fact, it is said that the International Military Observer Team mentioned earlier was at one time briefly trapped inside Owerri with Etuk and his boys. In desperation, a heavily armed 120-man federal rifle company was emergently airlifted from Lagos to Port Harcourt, according to an account provided by Major General Oluleye (rtd). When the Relief Company arrived, however, it found itself enmeshed in the internal politics of the 3MCDO. Just as he did against other Divisions when dealing with the Army HQ, Colonel Adekunle’s Brigade Commanders were fighting one another for access to ammunition and fresh troops, so they would often file false casualty, ammunition, and battlefield reports with Division HQ in order to gain advantage. Rather than deploy the federal company as a unit to link up with Major Hamman and Lt. Col Etuk at Owerri, therefore, Adekunle split up the force into little bits and shared them out among his warring Brigade Commanders. Eventually, only fifteen (15) soldiers were given the task of securing the Port-Harcourt-Owerri road to link up with the 16th Brigade!

On the Biafran side, while still trying to infiltrate the Midwest, Ojukwu announced in November that he had dismissed eight (8) white mercenaries, including Colonel Rolf Steiner, following allegations of indiscipline and piracy, including the waylaying of CARITAS relief supplies. Steiner apparently encouraged his special 4th Commando Brigade to commandeer not only food and drink, but also women. These acts did not go down well with regular Biafran units who were already seething with envy over Ojukwu’s preferential treatment of Steiner and his unit. In fact, according to Mr. Jensen of Radio Denmark, Steiner had been ordered to use the 4th Commando Brigade to lead “Operation Hiroshima” – the unsuccessful Biafran attempt to recapture Onitsha. When he lost over half of his troops in that operation, Steiner accused Ojukwu of murdering his men and slapped him in anger. But for Ojukwu’s intervention Steiner would have been shot immediately by Ojukwu’s bodyguards. He was, however, arrested and then expelled from Biafra the following day. Brigadier Conrad Nwawo took over command of the 4th Commando Division. [Nwawo is a former Nigerian Defence Attache in London. He was the one who secured the surrender of Major CK Nzeogwu to Major General Ironsi in January 1966, and was the last Commander of Midwestern 4th Area Command prior to the Biafran invasion of the Midwest in August 1967.]

After this “house-cleaning” in the High Command, on November 27, the “Umuahia Brigade”, which was actually a special 500-man battalion led by Major Njoku, repulsed a federal attack launched from Awka toward Agulu and Adazi junction. Njoku completely destroyed the 81 Battalion of the 1st Division in the process. The significance of this battle is that Nnewi, Ojukwu’s hometown, as well as Uga Airport were directly threatened. If federal forces had prevailed, the HQ of the Biafran 11 Division would have been put out of business.

With these loose ends tied up, then Colonel Ogbugo Kalu’s 14 Division was finally ready to move on Owerri. The 63 Brigade under Colonel Lambert Ihenacho launched a diversionary attack aimed at Elelem and Eziama on December 3rd. The main thrust of the first stage of the Biafran siege of Owerri later began on the 5th of December 1968, led by the 60 Brigade under Colonel Asoya. During the first week of the operation, 50,000 rounds of rifle ammunition, 200 rounds of 105-mm howitzer shells, 300 rounds of mortar bombs, 20 rounds of anti-tank rockets, along with grenades were supplied to the Biafran units involved. All of this ordnance was thrown against Etuk’s 16th Brigade in one week or less as they were dug in and around Owerri.

According to Madiebo,

“60 Brigade moved with a battalion each on three fronts. On the left, a battalion moved to clear Izombe and Obudi. From there, while a part of it moved to clear Ogbaku on the Ihiala road, the rest of the battalion moved to Ofogwe. From the centre, another battalion moved from the area of Okwuzu and Mgbede and took Obigwe and, shortly after, were in full control of Okuku. This particular move was so swift that the enemy Battalion Headquarters at Obudi did not realise for some time that it had been cut off together with most of the battalion sub-units. Thus many enemy soldiers and vehicles, which were either moving to Obudi or returning from there fell into our hands in the area of Okuku. The third battalion of 60 Brigade moving on both Ohoba-Umukanne road and Asa-Awarra road, took Umuakpu quite easily. Thus, in the first three days, the 60 Brigade had completed their tasks in the first phase, resulting in the clearing of several hundreds of square miles of enemy occupied territory.

68 Battalion was equally successful in clearing all enemy held areas left of the Port Harcourt road down to Mgbirichi, thus establishing a permanent link with the 63 Brigade. The 68 Battalion success left us completely in control of all areas southeast of Owerri town down to Owerrinta Bridge to a depth of about ten miles. The 52 Brigade facing the enemy forward concentrations made only small gains as expected. Once or twice they cleared Orji but lost it again. At the end of one week, the first phase was considered to be over and the results, particularly in 60 Brigade area were very encouraging.”

On the diplomatic front, however, all was not well with the Biafran leadership. Raph Uwechue, Biafra’s envoy in Paris, resigned in protest against Ojukwu’s approach to leadership. Meanwhile, on the battlefield the 16th Brigade regrouped and fought back. For example, Abiaka was retaken on December 19, while Avu and Afrola were regained on December 29, even as Imu-Ikwe was being seized by Biafran troops.

The fits and starts of French ordnance supply and inability to use captured but incompatible federal ammunition had compelled Madiebo to make changes in his original plans. He proceeded to carry out the second phase “with only one brigade fighting at a time, and as soon as its objectives were completely attained, the next brigade or formation would start”. In other words, a rolling choreographed offensive (like the first week of American attacks on Iraq during the 2nd Gulf War), rather than a decisive coordinated massive application of force exploiting the principle of momentum. Therefore, 60 Brigade began by once again assaulting Avu and Obinze while other units adopted a defensive posture. Each time, though, elements of the 16th Brigade would successfully counter-attack from Owerri, using armored personnel carriers, Ferrets and Saladin vehicles.

For this reason Madiebo decided to modify stage two (2) of his plan by cutting off the Port-Harcourt-Umuahia road further southwards. Along these lines, beginning on January 6th, early in the New Year (1969), the 60 Brigade took Umuakpu, Umuagwo and Omanelu from Umukanne on their right, while 68 Battalion detachment of “S” Division, under Major Ikeji seized Obinze. Every attempt, though, to retake Avu from Obinze was beaten back by Etuk.

OFFLINE

part 5 cont

At this point, Madiebo recalls,

“By the end of the day we were controlling over 20 miles of the road which was before then the last link between Owerri and Port Harcourt, thereby having the enemy brigade at Owerri completely surrounded. In order to ensure that the enemy on both sides of the corridor did not link up ever again, we used several hundreds of civilians to render that stretch of road absolutely impassable using mines, ditches and heavy trees felled across the road. Thereafter, the 68 Battalion which had grown gradually and been renamed the 68 Brigade, took charge of the defence of the Port Harcourt road (inclusive) westwards to 63 Brigade, while the 60 Brigade defended eastwards to Orashi River. From the 8th of January, 1969, the enemy began his counterattacks to reopen the road. These attacks, which came from the Port Harcourt end, persisted for several months unsuccessfully until we cleared Owerri town itself.”

The Biafran units involved were, however, experiencing some internal difficulties. Fatigue from the month long offensive, ups and downs with logistic support and illness resulting from hunger and inadequate clothing undermined morale. But the effort was continued by determined Biafran troops urged on by their commanders. On January 15, 1969 the final phase “to clear Owerri” was launched. 60 Brigade was to take the Holy Ghost College, the Cathedral and the Progress Hotel after which it would swing rightwards toward the Clock Tower and Motor Park, destroying the bridge over the Otamini river in order to prevent armored counter-attacks.

However, once they came upon abandoned Federal supplies of ammunition, food and clothing near the Holy Ghost College, rather than maintain hot pursuit, hungry and naked Biafran troops ignored their commanders. They stopped short of the Otamini Bridge not only to eat but also to “evacuate enemy abandoned food” and “change into the newly captured uniforms”. But while they happily savored the liberated food and clothing a federal armored counter-attack across the Otamini Bridge swept them out of Owerri back to the previous jump-off lines at their trenches in the perimeter.

This became the established pattern. Every week, Biafran units would launch a number of attacks in a vicious dialogue of attack and counter-attack with Etuk, all the while hoping that the 16th Brigade would eventually run out of ammunition. On January 16th, the 16th Brigade retook Afaha-Ise. But a week later on January 23rd, Otoro fell to Biafran units. The next day, on January 24th, a new federal offensive – including air strikes - was launched by the AHQ. But by January 29th, having sifted through the maze of Biafran propaganda on one hand, and the serious internal problem of false reporting by federal officers on the other, it became apparent to senior federal commanders in Lagos that Owerri was indeed encircled, except for small breaches here and there.

On February 7th, federal L-29 Delphin armed jet trainers, Mig-17 fighters and IL-28 Ilyushin Bombers destroyed Umohiagu village near Owerri – prompting yet another round of international press accusations that Nigerian (and Egyptian) pilots were indiscriminately bombing civilian targets while supposedly mounting military operations to relieve Owerri and take Umuahia. Outside the immediate War Theater, Nnamdi Azikiwe published a 14-point peace plan during a speech at Oxford on February 10th. A few days later a US Congressional delegation visited Biafra just as Maurice Foley, UK undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs, was openly accusing Nigeria in the House of Commons in London of indiscriminate bombing. After Umohiagu, for example, federal jets went further to level the village of Ozu Abam.

Meanwhile, the Nigerian Chief of Staff (Army), then Brigadier Hassan Usman Katsina called an urgent “coordination and unity” meeting in Lagos of all federal divisional commanders. As of that time rivalries between the various Divisions had become very bad. Each division was procuring its own weapons independently from Europe and sending “patrols” to mount surveillance at the Lagos Port for incoming Arms Shipments. They even laid siege on the Shell depot at Apapa in order to corner fuel supplies for themselves. Weapons and fuel meant for other divisions were often hijacked.

After this “peace meeting”, Major General Gowon finally paid his long awaited first official visit to the warfront in late February, during which he encouraged Lt. Col. Etuk to hang in there. Determined efforts were being made to relieve the beleaguered 16th Bde, just as Russian warships visiting Lagos were feting the public. Interestingly, bothered by international accusations the NAF HQ issued instructions to NAF units on March 5th, ordering them to avoid bombing civilians. Nevertheless, bombing continued.

In an article published by the UK Guardian on March 13, 1969, for example, Harvard Professor Mayer wrote, among other things:

“Hospitals, schools, refugee camps and markets have been and are being systematically attacked by the Nigerian Air Force. We witnessed such attacks and saw hundreds of casualties from previous attacks. The red crosses are now camouflaged on the roofs of the hospitals (and on the roofs of the headquarters of the International Red Cross) because they obviously attract bombing and strafing, even when (if not particularly when) the hospital buildings are isolated and far from any town, cross road or any installation even remotely of military significance. Refugees – most of them children and many of them elderly, all of them famished – who number at least four million – have to be fed at night because during the day feeding lines were systematically strafed by MIG 17s of the Nigerian Air Force or bombed by its Ilyushins.”

But by March 14th in spite of strong efforts to reopen the Omanelu-Umuakpu and Elele-Ubimini-Awarra roads the Biafran encirclement of Owerri was total. Without airdrops, the 16th Brigade was completely cut off. Gradually but surely it was being cut to pieces.


Yet another among many Biafran efforts to wipe out the 16th Brigade began on March 15th, when two additional battalions of the “S” Division were transferred from the Aba sector to Owerri. Ojukwu overruled Madiebo’s proposal to concentrate all the battalions of the “S” Division - under Colonel Onwuatuegwu - move through 68 Brigade area and attack Etuk from the rear. He reportedly preferred a direct frontal assault from Emekuku in the northeast. After heavy casualties, this unwise attempt stalled against fierce federal resistance, combined with some command and staff problems with Onwuatuegwu’s outfit. Thus, Onwuatuegwu was asked by Ojukwu to cede command of part of the “S” Division to Colonel Joe “Hannibal” Achuzia. Using the “S” Brigade under Major Atumaka, Achuzia broke through federal lines at Egbu and reportedly got within a mile of Owerri City Center after heavy casualties. At this point Achuzia wanted complete control of the entire “S” Division in order to sustain his momentum. However, Onwuatuegwu refused, and both men almost shot one another, drawing their handguns. Ojukwu then ordered Onwuatuegwu to cede complete divisional control to Achuzia for one week. But all subsequent bloody attempts by Achuzia to take Owerri failed. The “S” Brigade Commander, Major Atumaka died in the process along with many other Biafran soldiers. At this point Ojukwu ordered all frontal assaults by Achuzia to stop, restored Onwuatuegwu to his command of the “S” Division, and asked Madiebo to revisit the old plan of hitting Etuk from the rear.

Meanwhile, on March 24th, Haiti recognized Biafra. On March 29th 1969, Prime Minister Harold Wilson of Britain paid a visit to Nigeria during which the issue of indiscriminate bombing was again discussed with the federal government - leading to the eventual replacement of many Egyptian pilots. Allegedly, in the absence of stand-off precision-guided munitions, most of those involved were neither good shots nor were they willing to risk their lives attacking well defended military targets in another man’s war. So they “offloaded” on civilian targets and then returned to base to file false bomb damage assessments. However, it cannot escape suspicion that some bombing raids were calculatingly deliberate, aimed at the Biafran Organization of Freedom Fighters (BOFF), an irregular-fighting outfit that had thoroughly infiltrated civilian areas, as well as Relief Organizations suspected of providing cover for weapons shipments.

On March 31st, 1969, referring no doubt to Achuzia’s breakthrough at Egbu, Ojukwu made an entry into his Diary saying that “70%” of Owerri Town was now in Biafran hands following an assault by the 14 and “Thunder” Divisions. (“Thunder” Division was how Ojukwu sometimes referred to what many others called the “S” Division, perhaps to distinguish it from an earlier secret military formation also called the “S” Division, a special personal security unit dedicated to his protection.)

Biafran Engineers constantly monitored desperate Nigerian radio transmissions by wireless intercept. Citing additional “reconnaissance reports”, Madiebo claims that “the enemy was so short of food that he was compelled to kill most of his Biafran prisoners of war and civilian detainees inside Owerri because there was not sufficient food with which to feed them.“ There is no independent confirmation of this assertion.

OFFLINE

OWERRI, 1969 - PART 6





LIFE IN THE 16th BRIGADE UNDER SIEGE



According to Colonel E. A. Etuk (rtd),



“The rebels knew that we were helpless because the main route that we used from Port Harcourt to Owerri was blocked totally and there was no way to go in or come out. Whenever morning came as we would sit praying, the next thing we would hear was the noise of airplanes bringing cargo to Ojukwu and soon as that was done, throughout that night the whole area would be on fire; bombing everywhere.“



Given this degree of sequestration, therefore, the only option available to 3MCDO HQ and AHQ was to resupply the beleaguered Brigade by air. In aerial logistics jargon, this is known as a “tactical airlift in support of an isolated land battle area.” Without water, ammunition, food rations, fuel, blankets, medical supplies, tents, spare parts and other equipment etc, no fighting unit can sustain morale, nor remain cohesive and effective for long.



The Owerri Airdrop


There is some disagreement about the duration of the Owerri air resupply effort. A one-time Nigerian Chief of Air Staff, the late Air Marshall Ibrahim Alfa claimed the effort actually lasted for four months while Army sources claim it lasted for six weeks. Clearly, therefore, for at least six long weeks, inclusive of the period from March 14th and continuing until April 19th 1969, air resupply was the method by which the 16th Brigade of 3MCDO was logistically supported while under Biafran siege. Even then, there were complications.



Explaining how it all began, Colonel Etuk said:



“I got in touch with Adekunle and informed him that things were really bad. He told me to find a location for drops and to let him know. I never knew that as we were discussing, the rebels were picking the message. So when that time came I told him I was going into the war zone and that there was going to be a big flame at so and so time and at so and so point. Of course, the rebels had got [the entire] message. Before that time the rebels had gone down and prepared a big flame. Adekunle rang me and said his pilot had taken off [from Port Harcourt] with all the goodies for my troops.



The poor pilot sighted that first lighting point and dropped everything there while I sat waiting because I heard the plane when it took off hovering around. The pilot must have been a stupid man for I don’t know whether he couldn’t read his map to know exactly where I told my Divisional Commander things should be dropped. The whole stock was released to the rebels.



When I got back to the radio and then called Adekunle and said I have not seen anything, he said, “You bastard son of a ****, do you think you are the only commander I have?” The pilot went back and told him that he had delivered the goods and he said the pilot was there by him and he claimed to have dropped everything. Of course I replied that I saw nothing. That was the beginning of my woes, no supplies.”



What the barely four year old Nigerian Air Force (NAF) was attempting to do at Owerri in 1969 was the resupply, by airdrop under potential hostile fire, of an army infantry brigade of about 2,000 - 3,000 men – whose numbers dropped as casualties mounted. It is not as simple as it might appear on the surface.



The field of modern aerial logistics has its major doctrinal roots in western allied experiences gained during the aerial resupply of isolated Chinese and American troops fighting in Burma and China during World War 2 on the one hand and the ‘Berlin Airlift’ of 1948 on the other. In the case of the former, military cargo planes had to fly from the Assam Valley in India, hop over the so called “Hump” of the Himalayan Mountains and then deliver supplies to Burma and China.



However, lessons learnt from tactical airlift operations during the Soviet siege of the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad (1942-43), the siege by General Giap’s Viet Minh of French troops at Dien Bien Phu (1954), and the communist siege of US Marines at Khe Sanh (1968), better illustrate the main difficulties.



At Stalingrad, 250,000 German soldiers were surrounded. At Dien Bien Phu, a 16,500 man French garrison was encircled. At Khe Sanh, about 7000 marines were bottled up. In each of these cases, the airlift effort lasted for 60, 55, and 77 days respectively. An important distinguishing feature, however, was that in each case there was initially an available re-supply airfield into which aircraft could fly – under hostile fire – and offload supplies. At Khe Sanh, (which required 235 tons per day) this was accomplished to a large degree that helped assure the survival of the besieged units until they were relieved. Viet Minh artillery, however, put the airfield at Dien Bien Phu, out of action very quickly, forcing the French to rely on aerial para-drops – which makes the Dien Bien Phu experience similar in some respects to what happened at Owerri. At Stalingrad (which required 500 - 750 tons of supplies per day) and Dien Bien Phu (which required 200 tons of supplies per day) the effort failed. Khe Sanh was a partial success, in part because of the withdrawal of the North Vietnamese Army, once the likely diversionary purpose of the siege of Khe Sanh - to distract attention from the Viet Cong Tet Offensive - had been accomplished. Importantly, however, the besieged Marines received more tonnage of supplies than they actually required before eventually being relieved by the 1st US Cavalry Division during Operation Pegasus.



Be that as it may, to start with, no aerial resupply effort can proceed without appropriate quantities and quality of aircraft. Such aircraft include not just transport aircraft equipped to do the job, flown by trained pilots in reasonably good weather and free from competing obligations, but fighter escorts to protect against intercepting opposing aircraft and bombers to suppress opposing anti-aircraft ground fire. Such transport aircraft would need airfields to fly into, or possess the equipment and skills for low-altitude parachute extraction, ground proximity extraction, or para-drops of usually aluminium-based cargo pallets. To ensure a high delivery/requirement ratio that in turn assures the appropriate tonnage per soldier ratio, such para-dropped cargo pallets should land within designated drop zones, preferably as close as possible to the desired combat impact zone.



When, however, the civil war began in 1967, the NAF had only three aircraft types, namely, a few piston engine Piaggio P.149D trainer/liaison/utility and Dornier DO-27A general purpose light transport planes, along with some light Alouette Helicopters. When the first wartime forward operational base was established at Makurdi under then Captain John Yisa Doko, the inventory expanded to include not only a few Jet Provosts handed down from Sudan and Egypt, but also two Douglas DC-3 twin-engine 21-passenger aircraft acquired from the Nigerian Airways.



The DC-3 (and its various versions) was also known as the Dakota, and is arguably one of the most successful and resilient aircraft ever built. It was not seeing combat for the first time, nor was it new to military airlift (when appropriately modified as the C-47). By 1967 it had already seen action during the Second World War, Berlin airlift, Korean and Vietnam Wars. The military version could accommodate 28 fully armed soldiers, 7500 pounds of cargo or 18 stretchers for casualties. Fully loaded, however, the civilian version could carry no more than 6000 pounds of cargo.



Just as Biafran engineers had done with an old DC-3 in their possession, NAF engineers refitted the NAF DC-3s to carry bombs and machine guns. In addition, they were used for casualty evacuation. When additional forward operational bases were opened at Calabar, Benin and Lagos, the DC-3s were moved to Enugu, while subsequently acquired long range and larger DC-4s were later based in Lagos. The DC-3s saw action over the strategic Biafran Uli-Ihiala airstrip. They were used for nighttime high-altitude combat air patrol, waiting patiently in holding pattern high in the clouds for relief aircraft to arrive below. When the runway lights were briefly turned on for incoming relief and gunrunning planes, the DC-3 would swoop down to destroy the runway. Eleven relief aircraft were destroyed and 21 relief aircraft pilots killed at Uli-Ihiala in this manner. In time to come, however, one of the “Ihiala” DC-3s was redeployed to Port-Harcourt to perform tactical airlift support for the besieged 16th Brigade at Owerri. Meanwhile, fighter jets and bombers bombed the besieging Biafran forces.



Experience gained at Stalingrad, Dien Bien Phu and Khe Sanh suggests that required resupply tonnage per soldier ranged from about 5 pounds per day per soldier at Stalingrad to 60 pounds per day per soldier at Khe Sanh. During the siege of Dien Bien Phu the calculated requirement was 25 pounds per day per French soldier. The intensity of combat, weather, terrain and the degree of mechanization of the besieged troops account for the differences. Using this range, and assuming the resupply of 2000 soldiers, it would have required at least 10000 pounds and as much as 120,000 pounds per day of accurate airdrops sustained over several months to keep the 16th Brigade in full combat mode. With one DC-3 unable to lift more than 6000 pounds of cargo, this would have meant 2 – 20 round-trip flights every day in and out of potentially hostile Owerri airspace per DC-3. And Nigeria had only two DC-3s in its inventory. This illustrative calculation shows how potentially awesome the task was, even if drops were accurate. The projection outlined does not even factor in the psychological effect on besieged front-line troops knowing that they had no option for the evacuation of serious casualties.



I commented earlier that the experience of Dien Bien Phu was relevant to Owerri. One reason is that of the three classical examples mentioned, it was only at Dien Bien Phu that supplies and reinforcements had to be exclusively delivered by parachute once the resupply airstrip was destroyed by General Giap’s guerillas. The second reason for the importance of the Dien Bien Phu experience is that the aircraft type that was most often used for aerial resupply was the C-47, which is the military variant of the DC-3. Because of the inverse relationship between the altitude at which a cargo load is dropped and its degree of dispersion, particularly when crosswinds are strong, French practice was to release cargo at low altitude, from 2500 feet. However, as opposing anti-aircraft artillery fire became more violent and effective, the drop height was adjusted upwards, first to 6000 feet, and then to 8,500 feet. The effect of these high-altitude drops, as can be surmised, was that over half of the supplies meant for the French garrison drifted outside the drop zone into grateful Viet Minh hands. They then proceeded, not only to eat the food rations and enjoy the blankets, but to load high caliber artillery rounds supplied by the French Air Force into their field guns and use them with devastating effect against the French garrison.



As Colonel Etuk (rtd) said, and Generals Oluleye and Madiebo (among others) have documented, Biafran units took custody of well over 50% of the para-dropped supplies meant for the 16th Brigade during the siege of Owerri. Air Marshall Alfa supports Etuk’s opinion that this was the result of inexperience on the part of federal pilots. But Alfa also goes further to blame high-altitude drops and lack of operational coordination between the Army and Air Force. According to him,



“The Air Force was faced with a lot of difficulties in convincing some Army Field Commanders of the need for joint planning and briefing, in that some Army Field Commanders who had little or no knowledge of air operations were impervious to useful operational suggestions from the relatively young NAF Commanders. This action often resulted in crises of confidence which disrupted the smooth operation of the war.”



However, in addition, based on what we now know, the guile of Biafran officers, logistic requirements of the besieging Biafran units, and limited ability of the besieged Brigade to support airdrop operations in an increasingly small drop zone must be factored in. Until towards the very end, although unaware at that time, NAF pilots tasked with the resupply of the 16th Brigade had no need to fly at high altitude because Biafran anti-aircraft units – fully aware of their flight times and drop arrangements - had no intention of shooting them down. Neither, even if they wanted, at that stage of the war, was there any effective Biafran air combat or interceptor capability. The devastating ground attack of Count Von Rosen’s MFI-9B ‘miniCOIN’ aircraft against Port-Harcourt airport during “Operation Biafra Babies” took place on May 22nd – well after the Owerri situation had resolved itself. Thus, maintenance of air-superiority – which is always a big concern for military transports – was not in the picture. Airlift distance was not a problem for federal pilots either. The airlift distance from Port-Harcourt to Owerri was only about 40 miles. The flight from Enugu was just over 60 miles. There is no record of Biafran commandos attempting to sabotage federal airfields from which DC-3s were taking off for Owerri, as occurred during the siege of Dien Bien Phu. Viet Minh commandos immobilized over 70 French transport planes on the ground at the Cat Bi and Gia airfields to undermine tactical air resupply of the beleaguered French garrison.



Instead, the Biafrans made arrangements to collect from the DC-3 overflights at Owerri what they had been denied by DC-3 airfield denial attacks at Uli-Ihiala. According to Madiebo,



“After two months of daily promises of a link-up by Port Harcourt had failed, the enemy resorted to air dropping of ammunition and food. What was left under enemy control in Owerri was so small that most of what was dropped fell into Biafran hands. Any Biafran unit around Owerri which wanted something dropped for it by the enemy, only needed to clear a bit of bush, spread a white sheet of cloth over the clearing, and he would get a drop. Unfortunately, due to the gross inefficiency of the enemy air-drop operations, the very large quantity of ammunition we acquired through it was almost all damaged and therefore useless to the Army. Gunpowder was however laboriously extracted from the damaged ammunition for use by the BOFF and other civil defence organisations. As a result of enemy air drops, the 14 Division was for some time fairly well fed and thus became fitter for its operations.“



This situation was obviously frustratingly evident to the men of the 16th Brigade. According to Colonel Etuk (rtd),



“They [NAF] used passenger aircraft to be dropping things – so you come and see another line of battle – when this plane started coming and hovering around town, the rebels were waiting – when they knew that the plane was there they would be waiting for any drop that came – so it was a battle for my troops to be able to collect these things and for the rebels to – so it was cross-fire. So this thing continued and continued; each time the plane took off [from Port Harcourt] everybody was ready. At times the pilot would come but because of the firing from the rebels he would go back with all the cargo. He couldn’t come down nor could he even go within the level at which he should drop these things.”



The interesting thing about this scenario is that at no time were the NAF resupply DC-3s accompanied by NAF bombers. Tactical airdrops – usually launched in response to requests from the Divisional Commander - occurred independently of close air-support and ground-attack missions, which took place at other times!



“Biafra Kwenu!”


Quite apart from the drama of airdrops, life in the 16th Brigade under siege provided an opportunity to become intimately familiar with the mettle of opposing Biafran troops. According to Colonel Etuk (rtd),



“They [Biafrans] were more determined than the Federal troops from my own assessment because as a field commander certain times you move and think it was just going to be a child’s play but by the time you get there you’ll be faced with a different situation [sic] entirely. You may, for example, reach a point where you’ll have to dislodge three rebels. [Then] at a point you realize [sic] that you have put up a strong battle to dislodge them.



What about the woman who had always been threatening my troops, a female Captain! So a number of times my boys will come and say as soon as this woman comes she will stand just on the road like that and with her walking stick as soon as she surfaces she will say, “Biafra Kwenu! Biafra Kwenu!” They will follow up.



So one day, one Fulani boy came to me and said, “Oga, Walahi! Talahi! Zai kacheta” meaning, “I will kill her.” I asked him how he was going to do that. So when she came and started doing all that the boy just kept quiet. He took [sic] only one round. He dropped it on the ground and sharpened it, squeezed the sand off, tucked it in, aimed at her – because each time she came she would do that [and] the boys would run away. The boy aimed and got her right there and by the time we went to and recover the body – Oh! My God! That is why I said the rebels were determined. For us to succeed in getting this woman it was a tug of war. The rebels refused to let us carry this woman.”
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OWERRI, 1969 [Part 7]


THE 16th BRIGADE’S BREAKOUT FROM ENCIRCLEMENT



In his fine book “Epic Retreats – From 1776 to the Evacuation of Saigon” Stephen Tanner analyses retreat under pressure in seven military campaigns. They are General George Washington’s retreat from New York in 1776 during the American revolution, Napoleon’s retreat from Russia in 1812, and the great retreat of the Nez Perce Indians of the American West in 1877. Others are the evacuation of British expeditionary troops from Dunkirk in 1940, retrograde operations of the 1st Panzer army in the Caucasus in 1942, and the harrowing retreat of the American 8th Army from the Pusan perimeter in Korea in late 1950. Lastly, he reviewed the chaotic evacuation of Saigon in 1975 by American forces retreating from Vietnam.



However, the specific accounts of fighting withdrawals discussed in Tanner’s excellent book are by no means the only great examples from which serious students of military history can draw lessons. In my humble opinion, two specific examples of breakouts from encirclement deserve particular emphasis. They are:



1. The breakout of General W. J. Slim’s Burma Corps from Japanese encirclement at Rangoon and 900 mile retreat to Imphal (in India) under pressure in 1942.



2. The break out of the 1st US Marine Division under Brigadier General Lewis B. “Chesty” Puller from Chinese encirclement at the Chosin reservoir, under sub-arctic conditions in mountainous terrain during the Korean War, between November 27th and December 9th, 1950.



It is with these accounts, among others at the back of my mind, that I now return to the subject of this essay.



Choices open to the 16th Brigade at Owerri



Faced with encirclement, the 16th Brigade had a number of choices.



First, they could continue their attack northwards, deep along the original axes hoping to attain the initial grand objectives of ‘Operation OAU’ and relieve their sister Brigades in the process. As noted previously, this option was briefly pursued and then terminated.



Secondly, they could hold their position in Owerri and environs and defend encircled, as they did for many months. This was based not only on their original operational orders in September 1968 but also the direction of AHQ, confirmed by a “stand and fight” radio signal from the C-in-C, Major General Gowon himself in February 1969. It did seem that higher national pride (not to mention the need to maintain the aura of the 3MCDO and protect Colonel Adekunle’s image) was involved in the decision not to allow Owerri to be abandoned. Military factors in favor of this option included the built in advantage of defending an urban area, equipped with armored vehicles (which the besieging Biafrans did not have). These vehicles included Saracen Armoured Personnel Carriers, Ferret and Saladin Armored cars, which gave Etuk a fire power and mobility advantage using “interior lines” for rapid support by force transfer from his core support area of all round front-line positions in the “hedgehog”. In any case, if and when he had to break out he could rupture the encirclement by sheer armored force. In support of this optimistic thinking was the initial assumption that the Brigade could be supported by air, reinforced and relieved before certain destruction by the Biafran armed forces. The absence of Biafran air power and the curious initial Biafran strategy of attacking with one infantry Brigade at a time from only one direction in a sequential manner rather than a simultaneous all round assault encouraged such thinking. All Etuk had to do was “jab” with his front-line infantry positions and support artillery before delivering a powerful “counter-punch” using armored vehicles concentrated on the attacking force at the point of threatened penetration. The last factor that gave Etuk initial confidence was the federal effort to para-drop supplies, supported by occasional strafing and bombing of Biafran positions by NAF L-29, Mig-17 and Ilyushin fighter jets and bombers.



However, the Biafrans soon settled in for an alternative strategy. In between infantry assaults, harassing artillery fire and long range snipers gradually reduced the 16th Brigade by continuous external pressure through attrition. This approach enabled the besieging Biafran units to conserve men and perhaps redeploy them for emergencies in other fronts. But it had the disadvantage of using up a lot of ammunition in an endless **** of repeated bombardments, which, although murderous and highly effective, were ultimately insufficient to compel Etuk to surrender. It also allowed the siege to drag on. The “penetration” attempt by Colonel Achuzia failed because it used only one frontal axis. Eventually, 14 Division Commander, Colonel Ogbugo Kalu, supported by Major General Madiebo, armed with intimate knowledge of Etuk’s hopeless situation, correctly chose to attack, penetrate and exploit along multiple converging axes with little fear that Etuk – desperately short of men and supplies - could inflict punishment in retaliation. This combination of fire and maneuver eventually forced Etuk to choose between surrender, displacement, or complete destruction. When that point was reached, then Lt. Col. EA Etuk, with the support of his second-in-command, Major AT Hamman, decided they would ignore the suicidal orders of the 3MCDO HQ and AHQ to “hold until relieved.” They decided they would either break out or exfiltrate to the rear, in the direction of friendly 3MCDO forces.



Indeed, Biafran sources are of the opinion that Etuk considered this line of action at least three times. Two of these occurred in March when he first realized encirclement was total on or about March 7th, and then later in the month had to beat back ferocious efforts by the “S” Division to penetrate and divide his forces. Russian and German forces often did this to encircled enemy units during WW2. However, on each occasion impatient Biafran units rushed into the Owerri pocket in frontal pursuit to take advantage, only to be badly beaten back when Etuk suddenly reconfigured his armor for counter-attack.



There is some evidence that Biafran units used the technique of selective reduction of strong points. On February 10th, for example, Ojukwu claims that 500 Russian automatic rifles and 100 boxes of ammunition were secured from one of the 16th Brigade’s defensive positions. Madiebo does not, however, make any comment that such a vast haul of weapons was secured. In any case, organized systematic selective reduction targeted at large groups of key battlefield assets did not occur. This would have involved choosing one of Etuk’s main ‘teeth’ arm detachments, such as armor, for example, (or artillery) and then destroying that first (as a whole) before focusing on other combat and combat support elements. One reason was that Etuk usually withdrew his armored vehicles back into center of the Owerri pocket after using them for a counter-attack. He never left them open. The other reason was the shortage of appropriate anti-tank weaponry. It does, however, seem that there were efforts at reduction by infiltration which involved penetrating the perimeter with small commando units designed to isolate small elements of the 16th brigade from their parent unit.



During pauses between attacks, such as was the case when Ojukwu called off Achuzia’s penetration attack, Biafran Commanders supported their attrition strategy with continuous reconnaissance probes and psychological operations (psyops). Examples of psyops include the case of the female Captain who regularly showed up in full view of federal troops to hail “Biafra Kwenu” and the choice of nighttime to do most of the shelling of federal positions in Owerri. In addition, inadvertently routing the final approach to over-fly Owerri of early morning relief aircraft bringing ammunition to Uli-Ihiala airstrip before daybreak sent an unmistakable message to the besieged forces. They also had to live with the knowledge that most of the federal para-dropped ammunition and food meant for them were going to their tormentors. They even had to fight for the little they got! Then there were the sniper shots, slowly but surely killing all the leadership figures in the Brigade. All of this was backed up by electronic measures such as federal communications interception. On the flip side, Ojukwu visited Biafran units besieging Owerri at least twice in the month of March, raising morale and getting involved in tactical decisions.

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part 7 cont


Relevant developments outside Owerri



On the federal side and international front, other developments ultimately impacted the Owerri situation. At the February meeting in Lagos of divisional commanders mentioned earlier, a semblance of coordination was urged. But deep mistrust and rivalry remained. Colonel Adekunle, for example, did not tell his fellow divisional commanders (ie Colonels Shuwa and Ibrahim Haruna) in the 1st and 2nd divisions the full extent of his Owerri dilemma. Instead, the meeting focused on resolving the question of which Division would be given the task of taking Umuahia, following Adekunle’s disaster in October 1968 when he tried doing so on his own to beat Shuwa to it and end the war.



Therefore, rather than instructing the 1st Division to relieve the 16th Brigade directly by attacking Owerri from Okigwe which is 30 miles away (as the crow flies) in the north-easterly direction, Shuwa was told to veer southwest to take Umuahia, then administrative capital of Biafra. This clarified an old dispute with Adekunle but did not directly address the Owerri situation. In retrospect, although Umuahia was highly significant, if Shuwa had successfully attacked Owerri (rather than Umuahia) in early 1969, in coordination with a southern assault on Owerri from Port Harcourt by 3MCDO, both divisions would have relieved the beleaguered 16th Brigade. They would also have divided Biafra into two, separating the Biafran capital at Umuahia from its resupply airfield at Uli-Ihiala in the west. Chances are that the war – with its horrendous losses - may have been shorter.



The fall of Umuahia to the 1st Division will be discussed in detail in a future essay. In summary, Colonel Shuwa tasked the commanders of 1 and 2 Sectors (later called Brigades) of the 1st Division to take Umuahia and Bende respectively. Under the command of 1 Sector Commander, Lt. Col. ADS Wya, the plan for the fall of Umuahia – code-named Operation Leopard - was drawn up by his Brigade Major, Major Abdullahi Shelleng and the Sector Deputy Assistant Quartermaster General (DAQMG), Major Mamman Jiya Vatsa.



Meanwhile, the other brigades of Adekunle’s 3MCDO division had reorganized and recaptured Mkpom, Usung-Ubum, Ikot-Abia and Ikot Obom on February 3rd, followed on March 20th and 27th by the recapture of Umudike and Aba Ala earlier lost in the Biafran counter-offensive of 1968. The Colonel General Staff at 3MCDO HQ at this time was Major George Innih while Lt. Col. Emmanuel Abisoye, a former 2 Sector Commander with the 1st Division, was in charge of 3MCDO (rear) in Lagos, securing supplies for front-line units “by any means necessary”.



On March 27, 1969, with the support of a squadron of armored vehicles under Captain Garba Duba, 11 Field Squadron of Nigerian Army Engineers under Captain Gida Inakusu, “Q” Battery of Nigerian Army Artillery under Captain AB Mamman, and 1 Field Ambulance, five infantry battalions launched the assault on Umuahia. These battalions, namely the 4th, 21st, 25th, 44th, and 82nd were commanded by Major Ado Mohammed (later replaced by Lt. Steve Samaila Yombe), Major YY Kure, Lt. Balarabe Haladu, Major IB Babangida (later replaced by Major MJ Vatsa) and Major Ibrahim Bako respectively. NAF fighter-bombers later assisted in close air-support although there were a few unfortunate incidents of deadly ‘NAF friendly fire’ at Abriba and Uzuakoli.



A Zambian delegation had visited Biafra from March 13 – 15 followed two weeks later by the British PM’s visit to Nigeria. When the objective of ‘Operation Leopard’ became evident, Ojukwu started desperately mobilizing soldiers and resources from all corners of what remained of Biafra (including Owerri) to save Umuahia, eventually stalling but not stopping Col. ADS Wya’s advance in two weeks of fierce fighting. During the time, nevertheless, Ezi Alayi, Ovim, Amoyi, Ndi Ihube, Uzuakoli, Isikwuato, Umuokorola and Bende fell to the 1st Division, while elements of the 3rd MCDO took back Umuomayi and Okuenyi on April 4th. This was followed by the recapture of Obetete on April 5th which had been lost only 24 hours earlier. On April 13th, 3MCDO lost Obokwe again, typical of its extremely labile situation since October 1968.



Biafra’s final offensive to retake Owerri


Beginning with his visit to Uzuakoli, followed by the precautionary evacuation of the Biafran government from Umuahia to Nkwerre, near Orlu on April 4th up until the fall of Bende on April 14th, Ojukwu became increasingly concerned about the fate of Umuahia, where his bunker was located. According to Madiebo:



“By the 14th of April, it had become obvious judging from the situation on the ground, that Umuahia was going to be lost. It was also clear that such an event would destroy completely the will of the Biafran people to continue the war. It was then that Colonel Ojukwu told me of the need to revive the Owerri operation on the off-chance that we might score a victory there to counter-balance the loss of Umuahia. The idea was to share the few resources available into two to try and clear what was left of Owerri before it was too late. The whole idea was a calculated risk worth taking if the Head of State who alone knew what ammunition the nation had, thought so.



On the 18th of April, therefore, the Owerri operations were reopened. As I was still at Umuahia, I did not know exactly what was available for the offensive. However, the plan of the operation which was sent to me for approval, showed that the 60 Brigade was again to clear the right side of the town up to the Clock Tower and including the Holy Ghost College, the Catholic Cathedral and the Progress Hotel. The 52 Brigade, now under Major Igweze, was to have another go at Orji and the northern part of the town, down to the Public Works Department and the Government Secondary School. Elements of “S” Division under command of 14 Division in the absence of Onwuatuegwu, who was still at Umuahia, had the task of advancing through Egbu and Nekede into Owerri, as far as to the motor park.”



Far away in Monrovia, Liberia, the OAU consultative committee was meeting on April 17th. No one knew that history was about to be made on an African battlefield. Remnants of the 16th Brigade of the 3MCDO that had held Owerri since September 16, 1968 and was at least partially cut off for almost six months since November 1st, and totally besieged since March 14th, were about to break out. Etuk was finally persuaded not just by Biafra’s equally historic final offensive to retake Owerri, an act that in turn had been prompted by the impending fall of Umuahia to federal units under Col. ADS Wya, but by what transpired inside Owerri on April 19th.



April 19th, 1968: The Final DC-3 overflight and death of Major A Ted Hamman



On April 19th, Captain Francis Mokonogho and his DC-3 crew lifted off from Port Harcourt airport for yet another routine tactical airdrop over Owerri. But, unknown to them, fate beckoned. They flew right into a Biafran offensive. Biafran anti-aircraft gunners were no longer in the mood to accept the free aerial gifts from the federal government, nor were they going to allow Etuk the luxury of any more ammunition or food, no matter how small. Thus, they shot at the plane furiously, forcing Mokonogho to abort its final approach and turn around to Port Harcourt with its cargo. He barely made it back. The DC-3 was badly riddled with bullet holes. It would be the last attempt by the 3MCDO to resupply its beleaguered brigade.



Back in Owerri, Etuk, now at his wit’s end, was faced with the penetration of Biafran units, so close in one axis that they were nearly upon his HQ. He called his trusted second in command and Brigade Major (Hamman) aside for urgent consultations. They agreed – without reference to 3MCDO HQ or AHQ - that a last ditch effort to breakout towards the rear with all they had was only the only credible option. Surrender was out of the question.



As of this time, the surviving troops of the 16th brigade had acquired the “thousand yard stare.” As described by a survivor of the American break out from the Chosin reservoir in Korea, the stare results from a combination of tiredness, sleeplessness, and fear, combined, paradoxically, with a strong will to survive. When men get into that condition, they are fighting for no one but themselves and their buddies, not any country or imaginary ideal. For many months, the Brigade had endured chronic sleep deprivation, repeated mortar and 105mm artillery barrages, short, but repeated violent firefights back and forth in and out of foxholes and buildings with shot guns, rifles and machine guns. Practically every building in the town had been destroyed. Then there were the deaths of numerous colleagues, impromptu burials, personal injuries, near death experiences, rain, hunger, cold, heat, insect bites, separation from family, the emotional highs and lows of relief over-flights and DC-3 air drops, the stench, and worst of all, a suspicion that they had been abandoned.



According to Colonel Etuk (rtd),



“My decision to withdraw wasn’t proper. The Army Headquarters should [ordinarily] give me the go-ahead but I did [without authority] and said let me be court-martialled when I am out with my troops. [If] I didn’t do that, it would have meant complete elimination of the whole troops and that was what Ojukwu was waiting to do. If not through hunger it would have been through torture by whatever means he chose to use. But the Army Headquarters did little or nothing to get me as a Brigade Commander out of that place. What sort of battle organization is that? So I said to myself, ‘When I come out let them put me on trial.’ But they didn’t do it; maybe they knew that that was the only way to save the few lives I was able to…..”



“…..the rebels had penetrated into the town where my headquarters was situated and so the firing was so close; as we are sitting here you will just hear deafening sounds. One should not stay at a position for too long for the time may turn out to be enough for the enemy to kill you….”



“So one Sunday morning, when the rebels were almost at my headquarters and we were doing nothing because there was nothing we could do then – no ammunition, the men were gone, no weapons – I called the attention of others and said to them:



“We have to pull out of this place to see what we can do next week to save a few lives remaining”



So we set out towards Emmanuel College. We were all determined to get out of the place, be it a cook, a washerman; in fact, every one of us with or without a weapon. As we left, within 30 minutes after the decision, I heard a cry,



“Oga, come oh! Oga come oh! Dem don kill Oga oh!”



Behold, he was shot right there. The man was gasping for breath. He had a very large wound. If the road had been opened and if we had immediate medical attention, possibly his life might have been saved. There weren’t even drugs. The doctor I had was just sitting and watching while the man died.



“…before the poor boy died, he [Major Hamman] said,



“Oga, Allah, Allah, if I see Adekunle I will finish him. Adekunle is the man that has caused this.”



I said, “Well, we cannot say, but all we should be thinking is to be able to leave this place if it is possible.”


Coming as it did at the tail end of the siege, after a preliminary decision had been made to plan a break out, the death of the competent and popular Major Ted Hamman was absolutely devastating for unit morale. It stretched the cohesion of the unit to the limit and sorely tested the command and leadership skills of Etuk. The next day, April 20, 1969, Ojukwu made an entry in his diary, documenting the Biafran interception of weak federal radio transmissions from Owerri alerting 3MCDO HQ of Major AT Hamman’s death. However, 3MCDO HQ did not notify AHQ of the development. For the Biafran side, Hamman’s death was a signal that before long the 16th brigade might simply collapse.



Meanwhile, according to Colonel Etuk (rtd):



“The death of that young man forced me to take a decision of praying to God that if He is the God that delivered the children of Israel from Egypt then He should deliver my troops. Of course, God delivered us.”



The plan for the Breakout


Having left the decision to break out until so late in the game, the 16th Brigade was in the unenviable position of attempting it when already severely drained of its human and material resources.



Then Lt. Col. Etuk’s first priority was to determine possible escape routes through weak points and gaps in Biafran lines while at the same continuing to give the impression that he was maintaining all round defence. The timing would have to be precise to prevent the encircling forces from sealing off his escape route or launching a final all-out offensive against him before he had the time to escape. The other potential problem was that since either 3MCDO HQ or AHQ had not actually ordered the breakout, there would be no coordinated assistance from friendly external forces outside the Owerri pocket. Nor could prospective plans be made for a link-up at that stage of the game. To compound matters, it is not clear that Etuk was reliably informed while in isolation at Owerri, of ongoing federal military operations outside the Owerri area or the precise locations of federal units. He knew that his sector commander – Colonel Godwin Ally – was based in Port Harcourt, but he also knew that all along the route to Port Harcourt, Biafran soldiers had the habit of wearing the Nigerian uniforms of dead Nigerian soldiers.



Another big problem was what to do with enemy civilians and prisoners of war (POWs) as well as wounded and dead Nigerian soldiers - from recent skirmishes or sniper activity - who had not yet been buried. To leave the civilians and POWs behind would simply create an opportunity for the betrayal of operational security. To shoot them would be illegal and counter-productive, since they may well be useful as “human shields”. As for the dead body of his second-in-command, Major AT Hamman, unit morale and officer bond demanded that he take it along. Thus, Etuk decided to take everyone along. The corpse of the late Major Hamman was entrusted to one Captain Buhari, a former NCO who had served in Enugu before the war.



To mislead the Biafrans, Etuk aligned his vehicles in a manner that suggested a breakout along the main road. Then he decided to launch the effort in the early morning hours before sunrise to exploit the limited visibility.



In the course of all the months of defensive fighting throwing back Biafran attacks from all directions, Etuk had made a number of important observations based on his early warning systems and reconnaissance reports. Man being a creature of habit, he noticed that there was an axis from which the Biafrans had not attacked for a long time. Along this bush track there was an old bridge – the only one leading to the town. Although a retrograde assault river crossing is by no means an easy operation he elected to use it. He reasoned that it would be an unexpected route – thus exploiting the principle of surprise – and if it succeeded it gave him the best chance of avoiding confrontation with strong Biafran units in the perimeter.



The first step, therefore, was to establish the feasibility of using the planned route. Elements of the Engineer Squadron attached to the Brigade were sent to reconnoiter the bridge. Not surprisingly, they discovered that it was heavily mined with explosives and returned to Etuk to report their finding. He then ordered them back to the bridge under cover of darkness to disarm the explosives.

OFFLINE

part 7 cont


According to Etuk:



“They came back sometime later saying they had a successful operation. The news made me happy because it meant that I had boys who were ready to fight. They said that if we could just cross the river, then we could fight our way all through.”



Once this was accomplished on April 24th, 1969, Etuk decided it was time to move. Preoccupied with his own travails, he may have missed the big news that at 1500 hours on April 22nd, the 21 Battalion under Major YY Kure and 44 Battalion under Major MJ Vatsa, both of the 1st Division entered the abandoned town of Umuahia – Biafra’s erstwhile capital.



Late that night (24th/25th), Etuk called his boys and gave the formal order for the Owerri break out. Excess ammunition that could not be taken along was buried. Strict radio silence was to be maintained. The force was organized with armor and artillery leading as the perimeter rupture or breakout force in front of the main body of the convoy. Meanwhile infantry elements folding back from their positions along the perimeter to join the convoy were instructed to fight rearguard and flank action to delay and frustrate any Biafran counter-attack. An infantry and engineer detachment was told to secure the far end of the riverbank to protect the vital crossing site during the initial stage of breakout. Because of the lack of resources there were no diversionary attacks. It was all based on speed, momentum, surprise and stealth.



But the element of surprise was not total. Biafran forward observers from besieging units knew something was up, although they failed to anticipate the precise route of breakout via a disused old road track. Fate and luck also played a role. Etuk may have been helped by a decision made by Madiebo not to attack the breakout force inside Owerri. Madiebo was concerned that Etuk might suddenly reconfigure and use his armored vehicles with deadly effect – as he had done in the past.



According to Madiebo:



“Right from the very start of his operation, it was clear the enemy was beginning to feel the bite of his over four months of isolation inside Owerri town. Everywhere his resistance was stiff but shortlived and mainly sustained with armoured vehicles. From the four corners of Owerri, our troops gradually closed in, and even began to set up road blocks in parts of Owerri. Yet in the part of the town the enemy occupied, it was still impossible to break through the armour barrier. That was the situation when I returned to Owerri front in the evening of the 23rd of April, 1969, following the fall of Umuahia the previous day. The first report I got on my arrival was that the enemy at Owerri had lined up all his vehicles facing southwards, in a manner suggesting a withdrawal. After a very lengthy discussion of the situation with the Division Commander, I decided it would be better to allow the enemy to leave the town and then attack him somewhere out of Owerri, at a point where we still stood a chance of destroying him. I thought that for us to put in everything we had against the enemy inside the town could result in our exhausting our limited resources without success, and then run a risk of losing a large part of the town which we already controlled. For that reason, a battalion of 60 Brigade was despatched to Umuguma to wait for the enemy. To encourage the enemy to start the move we began to shell his convoy at a very slow rate with the little quantity of bombs we had. During the month of March, the enemy had on two occasions similarly lined up his vehicles to withdraw from Owerri. On each of those occasions, we had attacked him and it had resulted in his redeploying to defend himself and successfully too. This time we were not going to attack him and therefore hoped that he would not change his mind.

During the night of the 24th of April the enemy began to move out of Owerri to the uncontrollable joy of all. Once out of town, a Biafran company was put on their trail to harass them and hasten the withdrawal. At Umuguma, the major battle began on the morning of the 25th and the enemy suffered very heavy casualties indeed. Many vehicles carrying women, children and enemy casualties were allowed to proceed on their journey southwards unmolested. After 24 hours of heavy fighting the enemy shifted further down to Avu, only to face another biafran force waiting for them there. After barely four hours encounter at Avu, the enemy moved again further south to Ohoba and there linked up with his counterparts advancing from the south. Thereafter all attempts to move him again failed, in the same way as did all his attempts to move back from there into Owerri.”



Etuk recalls it differently. According to him:



“I called my officers and told them, ‘This morning I am calling you, telling you, giving you directive as your Commander that we are leaving Owerri by 6 o’oclock. If you like follow me; if you like stay here;” they laughed and retorted, ‘Oga don come oh! Ah! Oga. Wey the men now to fight the rebels? Wey the weapon? Wey the ammunition?” I said, ‘Don’t you worry, we are going.’”



So by 6 o’clock we decided to take off; all of us, men, women, rebel prisoners of war etc. We all moved out of Owerri. I said within my mind that this is what they call American wonder. Let them sit and wait for me at the tarred road while I use track. There was no time to waste and before long we linked up with [Colonel] Godwin Ally.”



The link-up was not without high drama, however. After rupturing the encirclement, the main body of the convoy moved out in front of the original mechanized rupture force. As noted previously, the main danger was determining how to distinguish Nigerian from Biafran troops wearing Nigerian uniforms. While the women and children were out in front, Etuk and his troops were behind assessing the situation ready to fire if necessary.



According to him:



“…it became so nasty that you wouldn’t know who was who. With the assistance of my binoculars I was able to sight troops standing up there; soldiers moving around and it was difficult for me to know whether they were friendly troops or rebels…….



I had to send my intelligence officer to disguise himself as a hunter with a note to [Colonel] Ally that when I wave my hand he should wave and I would know it was a friendly force. Because at this time there was no question of saying there was connection in terms of radio, no! We were all saying ‘life or death let us face whichever.’ So by the time this young man got there and gave him the note all I saw was a wave of hand as arranged….”



But there was one final surprise for the survivors of the 16th Brigade encirclement. When they got back to their mother division in Port Harcourt, they discovered that their identity had been changed. Colonel Adekunle had written off the 16 Brigade as totally lost and created a brand new unit called the ’16 Infantry Commando Brigade.’ Etuk and his boys were told that they were all presumed dead. Needless to say, the men went berserk.

OFFLINE

part 7 cont


HOW THE ARMY HQ DISCOVERED THAT OWERRI HAD BEEN RECAPTURED


The exact date Owerri was lost was not reported to AHQ by the 3MCDO. On April 26th 1969, the BBC announced the previous day’s recapture of Owerri by Biafran troops. That was how Major General Gowon and the AHQ in Lagos found out about it on radio in Lagos.



According to Major General Oluleye (rtd), it was only after a confrontation between then Colonels Shuwa and Adekunle of the 1st and 3rd divisions respectively, at an Army conference in Lagos, that the GOC 3MCDO admitted that Owerri had fallen.



According to Major General Shuwa (rtd),



"When Adekunle heard that Umuahia was taken, instead of telling me, "Thank you, well done!” he now asked, "Why did you take Umuahia?"



Shuwa turned to the gathering of senior army officers and said,



"Here is the map, Adekunle should show us where his troops are in Owerri.”



He was sitting down.



“Show us where your troops are."



General Hassan asked why I was demanding that. I said:



'Sir, I have been trying to get these boys on their wireless; by now I don't think we have any boy left in that town. The last time I heard human talking was three days ago. I think these boys are gone. We have lost them."



So Hassan said: "Please Adekunle, show us where the boys are." He said they were about 10-15 Kilometers outside the town.



I said, "Sir, there is no truth in that."



Hassan said: " You are in Enugu. How do you know that these boys were gone."



I said, "Okay, find out."



Adekunle finished talking. So I went to the telephone and was ringing the Brigade Head [Commander] for Hassan."



Hassan commented, "I Division is telling us to tell the world that we lost."



I said, "No Sir. You don’t do it like that oh!"



He had to announce on network that for tactical reasons the 3 Marine Commando pulled out of Owerri and actually we did. There was a routing and 90% of our boys died... “



Lamenting then Colonel Adekunle’s lack of candidness about the conditions within his Division and unwillingness to seek assistance, Shuwa said:



“Now, if he was so pressed and he knew he was not going to be able to extricate himself by himself; if he said, look, 1 Division, you must try as much as you can and push towards me so that you may relieve pressure on me, we could have, instead of going to Umuahia, pushed toward Owerri and could have relieved the pressure. I [had] the troops. I [had] the ammunition. I didn’t see the reason why I should sit down [doing nothing] and I was familiar with the ground."



Then Colonel Adekunle on the other hand, may have been misguided by other considerations. According to him, he often misinformed the Army HQ,



“Because in the first instance you [they] want the glory of the Civil War to go to the North alone. That the North alone will say we saved this country. That you [they] didn’t believe in any other person being able to do it”

OFFLINE

OWERRI, 1969 [Part 8]

CONSEQUENCES OF THE BIAFRAN RECAPTURE OF OWERRI


The failure to relieve large isolated battle groups in critical theaters of war often portends devastating military and political consequences. Classical examples previously noted include Stalingrad and Dien Bien Phu. Owerri was no different. The Biafran recapture of Owerri following the breakout and fighting withdrawal of the 16th Brigade resulted in very significant consequences on both sides.



Biafran consequences



Zdenek Cervenka identified five consequences to Biafra of the recapture of Owerri. They are:



1. It sent a signal to Nigeria and the world that despite all the reverses of the war to date, Biafra was still capable of significant resistance.



2. It destroyed the myth surrounding the federal 3rd Marine Commando Division and its well known commander, Colonel B.A.M. Adekunle, a.k.a. “Black Scorpion”.



3. It enhanced road and telecommunications links within the residue of Biafra.



4. It relieved the threat to the strategic Uli-Ihiala airstrip.



5. It created a hinge point for subsequent aggressive Biafran probes towards Port Harcourt.





Former Nigerian and Biafran soldiers who bore direct witness to the event have amplified all of these consequences and more. According to Madiebo:



“The Owerri victory revived the dying Biafra. All Biafrans who a few days before wanted nothing but an end to the war, now pressed for a continuation of the struggle to the end. The Umuahia disaster was soon forgotten and the only quarrel civilian military tacticians had against the Army was that they allowed the enemy to escape from Owerri. The enemy left a considerably large amount of ammunition of different calibres, but he managed to take away almost his entire heavy equipment including armoured vehicles and artillery pieces. The town was completely ravaged and not a single building was habitable without major repairs. All vehicles not taken away by the enemy were overturned and burnt by him.”



In addition, Madiebo claims that:



“Mass graves were discovered all over the town and the victims appeared to be civilians and prisoners of war.”



It is more likely, however, that those graves were predominantly graves of the thousands of soldiers of the 16th brigade that died between September 1968 when they first arrived and April 1969 when survivors broke out of the siege. No official casualty count has ever been rendered, but if Major General Shuwa’s estimate is correct, then it can be surmised that of the approximately 3000 soldiers that confidently thundered into the town in September 1968, about 300 made it back alive in April 1969. Assuming they were all recovered and buried, the graves of over 2000 Nigerian soldiers killed in action were thus among those the besieging Biafrans “discovered” after retaking the town. In any case several independent international sources confirm that what was left of the 16th Brigade brought along a large number of civilians and prisoners of war out of the Owerri pocket.



That said, favorable and unfavorable reactions within and outside the Biafran military to the victory at Owerri were not without high drama and recrimination. For example, Madiebo, who had held the rank of Major General since September 1967 when he relieved Brigadier Hilary Njoku as Commander of the Biafran Army, observed in his memoirs that:



“The Head of State put out a long list of promotions to commemorate the recapture of Owerri. He himself became a General while Okwechime, Eze and Kalu were all promoted to Brigadiers. Various others were promoted except Onwuatuegwu, the darling of the people, who was left out of General Ojukwu’s list. That omission became a national political issue. “Jet 77,” the government sponsored propaganda company of Onwuatuegwu’s “S” Division accused the Army Headquarters of not promoting Onwuatuegwu because it hated him. The “Jet 77” produced hand-outs for the public in which they revealed that the “S” Division under Onwuatuegwu had cleared the Ugba junction and Owerri and, on each occasion, the gallant Onwuatuegwu got nothing in return but humiliation from the GOC of the Army.”



“I was not worried by this propaganda which I knew was just one of those false rumours deliberately released against various individuals from time to time in order to control their popularity with the masses. I often disagreed with Onwuatuegwu in the same way I disagreed occasionally with all other commanders under me. To talk of an Army Commander in war loving or hating officers under his command is being childish in the extreme. In such a game involving human lives, a commander’s aim is to end it successfully as soon as possible. Onwuatuegwu, as an individual being the godfather of my first son and the officer closest to my family, knew I was putting the welfare of the people before family ties and friendship.”



Incidentally, newly promoted Brigadier Michael Okwechime, the first indigenous Commander of Nigerian Army Corps of Engineers, was the Adjutant General of the Biafran army at that time. His last “Nigerian” posting was as the officer in charge of Engineering and Communications in the 4th Area Command HQ in Benin City. Like Brigadier Conrad Nwawo, he too was based in the Midwest at the time of the Biafran invasion in August 1967, but folded into the Biafran rearguard as it retreated to Biafra. Brigadier Anthony Eze, on the other hand, was then Commander of the Biafran 12 Division in the Aba sector. He had served in the Nigerian Army as the first indigenous commander of the Corps of Signals. His last “Nigerian” appointment was as the Commanding Officer of the Lagos Garrison before the July 29, 1966 coup.



Interestingly, the recapture of Owerri also led to changes in the way General Ojukwu now proposed to conduct Biafran military affairs. According to Madiebo:



“After the fall of Umuahia and the recapture of Owerri, General Ojukwu in May, 1969, took two significant decisions for reasons best known to him. Thereafter I was allowed to see the Head of State on military matters at any time of the day or night without booking for an appointment in advance----a privilege I had not enjoyed before then. Again the Head of State decided to set up a Joint Planning Committee chairmanned by himself, with the Chief of Staff, General Effiong, and the Commanders of Army, Navy and Air Force as members. In addition, I was given the privilege of controlling for the first time, a small fraction of the national ammunition holding, but the bulk of it still remained under the control of the Head of State.”



These tepid changes reflected an effort on the part of Ojukwu to signal sensitivity to criticisms of his leadership style that dated back to the beginning of the conflict. Civilians were often played off against soldiers. He created special units that reported to him and no one else, and regularly subsumed the authority and responsibilities of his military commanders. As US Marine Major Stafford observed in his Staff College analysis of the war, Ojukwu “established directorates to control the logistical aspects of the war efforts, thus creating a rivalry not only with the military but also with the existing civil service.” Stafford concluded “the cumulative effect of these special units and extra-organizational control groups divided the direction of the war effort. They took authority away from those most responsible for fighting the war--the military--and institutionalized Ojukwu's actions to mitigate any potential political opposition by producing a fragmented power structure that answered only to him. “



Indeed, long after the war, in an interview a few years ago with the Nigerian Army Civil War Historical Investigative Team, Ojukwu himself said (among other things):



“……I sat in my office as Military Governor, Head of State, whatever it was, Army Commander, I was them all…(Italics mine)…”



“…..Believe you me, nobody went into battle on my side with more than 10 rounds in his rifle. Nobody! I will go further. As Head of State, I was the one to allocate mortar shells to various companies. (Italics mine) Whenever, during the war, you heard of a serious bombardment from the Biafran side, that should be taken as a sign that I personally commanded that front…..I was in personal command so I could call for certain extra ammunition…...” (Italics mine)



It is not surprising, therefore, that “General of the People’s Army” Ojukwu’s proposed collegiate reorganization after the recapture of Owerri was not designed to be implemented. Madiebo recalled that,



“All those privileges and changes were in effect an eye wash, designed to satisfy civilian and military pressures, which had existed since the beginning of the war, in favour of the establishment of a war council. Civilians now had the impression that not only did we do joint planning, but also that the Army Commander controlled all ammunition. The Joint Planning Committee met once a week from May 1969 to the end of the war but not one of the 14 operational plans, which it produced, was ever carried out. The committee planned all the time without knowing what was available; and invariably at the end of each plan it discovered that there were no resources for such a plan which would then be discarded and a new plan produced. The Planning Committee under Brigadier Okwechime worked like that until the end of the war. However, we looked forward to JPC meetings because they were held in the State House, one of the very few places in Biafra where one could get a glass of cold beer.”

OFFLINE

part 8 cont


Federal Nigerian consequences


On the federal Nigerian side, according to Major General Oluleye (rtd),



“With the loss of Owerri, Benjy’s [ie Colonel Benjamin Adekunle’s] image was both militarily and politically dented. Army Headquarters pressed fanatically that Benjy had to be relieved to save further loss of lives. The C-in-C did not agree until the rebels came close to Igritta and civilians in Port Harcourt started fleeing back to Lagos. I think the C-in-C was more concerned with political stability in the rear. Had there been no set backs, relieving Benjy could have been impossible. Benjy had become spent months before.



It was at this stage that the C-in-C directed me to implement an earlier recommendation of splitting the Division into two. But I told him I had no resources and went further to state that there was no alternative to the removal of the Black Scorpion. It was on this occasion that the Chief of Naval Staff, Vice Admiral [Commodore] JEA Wey described me as the ‘Ifa Oracle of the Army’ adding that I gave indication of a major disaster occurring sometime in the southern sector but that I could not predict the exact time. On this note, the C-in-C gave up the idea of retaining Benjy in the front. He then directed that I should head a panel to recommend the necessary changes. The panel recommended the reliefs of all the Field Commanders so that tribal meanings might not be read into the changes. (Italics mine)



As at that time, the famous 3rd Marine Commando had been crippled and it required rebuilding through reinforcements of all forms. The Black Scorpion had become completely worn out. He had become [so] unpopular among the rank and file of his division that he could not safely visit the front again for fear of dear life.”



In fact AHQ received many petitions against Adekunle from some of his own Brigade Commanders and Staff officers. Others simply abandoned the Division in protest against him, without authority. Oluleye’s assessment is consistent with that of General Olusegun Obasanjo (rtd). In his opinion,



“The Federal victory in capturing Umuahia, the next rebel administrative headquarters after Enugu, was almost immediately effectively nullified by the loss of Owerri to the rebels. The rebels, strengthened and emboldened by their recapture of Owerri, swiftly advanced southwards to threaten Igritta, a distance of fifteen miles north of Port Harcourt on the Owerri road. The federal finger-tip hold on Aba was considerable weakened. The morale of the soldiers at least of 3 Marine Commando Division was at its lowest ebb. Desertion and absence from duty without leave was rife in the Division. The despondence and general lack of will to fight in the soldiers was glaringly manifest in the large number of cases of self-inflicted injuries throughout the formation. Some officers tacitly encouraged these malpractices and unsoldierly conduct by condoning such acts or withdrawing their own kith or kin or fellow tribesmen to do guard duties in the rear and in the officers' own houses. Distrust and lack of confidence plagued the ranks of the officer corps. Operations were unhealthily competitive in an unmilitary fashion and officers openly rejoiced at each other's misfortunes. With the restrictions imposed by the Federal Military Government on many items of imported goods and the country in the grip of inflation, the civilian population began to show signs of impatience with a war, which appeared, to them unending. In fact, some highly placed Nigerians started to suggest that the Federal Government should sue for peace at all cost to prevent the disaster that would befall it and its supporters if rebel victory seemed imminent.”



The Biafran high command sensed all of this. Preparations were, therefore, made for an ambitious “hot pursuit” – which eventually began in mid-July. With the 14 Division (under Brigadier Ogbugo Kalu) thrusting toward Port Harcourt from Owerri, the 12 Division (under Brigadier Eze) planned to seize Aba and then drive southwards to link up with Kalu in Port Harcourt followed by seizure of Bonny. From there they would swing eastwards, in collaboration with other Biafran units, with the objective of recapturing Ikot-Ekpene and Calabar, thus evicting the federal army from the Biafran seaboard.



Nevertheless, in the weeks immediately following the Biafran recapture of Owerri, airwaves were preoccupied with news reports of the 3MCDO recapture of Okpuala, Olakwo, Obokwe, Eziama, Umukani and Umuagu. These reports were punctuated by the subsequent kidnap of Italian oilmen at Kwale in the Midwest by Biafran commandos on May 9, 1969. On that same day, quietly, behind the scenes, an Army HQ operational order was issued, changing all the federal divisional commanders. Following an article by British Major General HT Alexander in the Sunday Telegraph of May 11 criticizing the Nigerian military, it was publicly announced on May 12, 1969 that Colonel Olusegun Obasanjo had replaced Colonel Benjamin Adekunle as GOC 3 Marine Commando. On May 16, 1969, Obasanjo physically took over the Division in the field. Simultaneously – to avoid ethnic interpretation - Lt. Col. G.S. Jalo relieved Col. Ibrahim Haruna of the 2nd Infantry Division while Col. I. D. Bissala was billed to take Colonel Shuwa’s place at 1st Infantry Divisional HQ. The actual change of command in the relatively well-organized and managed 1st Division, however, was delayed until the end of September.



Hesitation in the High Command: Why Gowon was reluctant to replace Adekunle



It took six months, the Owerri disaster and the subsequent Biafran threat to Port Harcourt to convince Major General Yakubu Gowon – prodded by then Commodore Akinwale Wey - that new leadership was required for the 3MCDO. Why?



Colonel Benjamin Adekunle (a.k.a. “Black Scorpion”) became a political and folk hero after stunning military successes at Bonny, Warri, Sapele, Calabar and Port Harcourt. These successes, amplified by his penchant for national and international publicity, made him a household name in his native Western State. He seemed to emulate American General Douglas MacArthur and likely saw himself as a Nigerian Caesar. Indeed, I recall that as a primary school student in Lagos and subsequently as a secondary school student in Warri, we often chanted songs that extolled Adekunle’s heroic contributions to the war. In one example, we would chant:



Lead singer: “One Nigeria!”



Chorus: “Adekunle sector!”



And this would go on and on as if there were no other sectors, divisions and divisional commanders involved in the war. As young and impressionable children, we were totally ignorant of his military errors and disasters, even less so his curious order directing troops to “shoot anything that moves” once he got into the core Igbo areas of Biafra.



Furthermore, given the initial political prevarication of the Yoruba West in joining the federal effort against Biafran secession (until the Biafran Midwest/West invasion), Gowon, a northern minority, even when privately admonished by senior Yoruba officers, was very leery of burning that ethnic bridge – shaky though it was. After all, back in May 1967, just before the war began, a delegation of senior Yoruba officers including Colonel Olutoye, Lt. Col. Olusegun Obasanjo, Majors Sotomi, Akinrinade and Ayo-Ariyo had presented a demand to Gowon for northern troops to be transferred out of Lagos and the West. They were doing this in follow up to a similar demand by Western region Governor, Colonel Adeyinka Adebayo. Adebayo had not only asked for northern troops to leave the West but also told Gowon to shift the venue of Supreme Military Council meetings to Akure where he felt safer. All of this was coming after Chief Obafemi Awolowo’s declaration that “if the Eastern region is allowed by acts of omission or commission to secede from or opt out of Nigeria, then the Western region and Lagos must also stay out of the federation.” Those were difficult days for Gowon and he had not forgotten. During that crisis, his loyal Commander of the Lagos Garrison Organization was none other than Major Benjamin Adekunle.



To complicate Gowon’s position, the West was not politically stable during most of the war, particularly between 1968 and 1970. Agitation for the creation of a separate Yoruba central state to include Oyo and Ibadan provinces (Oyo State) was the first shot in the saga and may have been an ongoing factor during subsequent events. There was also the so-called “Omopupa” riot in Lagos, ultimately crushed by the Lagos Garrison Organization under then Lt. Col Anthony Ochefu. Then there was restiveness among old farmers and hunters – also known as the “Agbekoya rebellion” – in the West. Anger was driven by frustration with intrusive, violent and corrupt government tax collectors at a time of bad harvest of swollen shoots, inflation and economic recession caused by low cocoa prices. Taking inspiration from the Maiyegun league of yesteryears, beginning around Ibadan, the revolt soon spread to Ogbomosho (Adekunle’s hometown), Ede, Ijebu-Remo and Egba areas of the West. Local government offices were attacked and sacked, necessitating massive internal security operations by the Police and Army – particularly the Ibadan Garrison Organization led by then Colonel Oluwole Rotimi. Indeed, things got so bad at one point that then Western State Governor, Brigadier Adeyinka Adebayo, reportedly had to flee Ibadan for safety and rioters later killed the traditional ruler (Shoun) of Ogbomosho. At another point insurgents freed prisoners at the Agodi prison in Ibadan. Because of the government’s initial suspicion that the riots were linked – according to General Gowon - to “causes extending beyond dissatisfaction with the level of taxation,” a compromise was needlessly delayed. It was not until October 1969 that then Federal Finance Minister and former Western region premier, Chief Obafemi Awolowo negotiated an agreement with the Agbekoya resulting in a reduction of the flat tax rate to £2 a year, accompanied by amnesty for tax defaulters.



With such political tensions in the Yoruba rear, and intelligence reports of Colonel Adekunle’s political and military ambitions, Gowon became fearful of a potential coup d’Etat staged by the “Nigerian Caesar” if he was rendered jobless lurking around in Lagos. Indeed General Obasanjo (rtd) once wrote that “I knew of people of Western State origin who had felt politically victimized and who saw in Col. Adekunle a savior and told him so, and he believed them.”



Not until Adekunle destroyed his own name and mythical reputation, therefore, even among Yorubas, was Gowon finally comfortable enough – in the face of overwhelming military justification - to fire him. Even then, mindful of his services to the nation, he refused to probe serious allegations made against him. Instead he promoted him substantive Colonel and gave him a desk job as Director of Training and Planning at AHQ. He was also careful not to tinker with the “Northern-Western” alliance against the “East” and expose himself to charges of tribalism by replacing ALL divisional commanders simultaneously – irrespective of military effectiveness. To refine this further, he made sure another Yoruba officer – then Colonel Olusegun Obasanjo - replaced Adekunle at the now famous (some say notorious), albeit battered 3MCDO.



Three additional factors are often cited for Gowon’s ambivalence by Major General Oluleye (rtd), and others, who were in a position to see things at close quarters. The first is that he was actually fond of Adekunle as a “can do” officer. The second was that Gowon was basically a “nice man” who never wanted to hurt anyone’s feelings. Some saw this as weakness, others as a virtue. Lastly, Gowon – who maintained independent radio links to divisional commanders - was personally liable for encouraging Adekunle to disobey Army HQ back in September and October 1968 when he diverted resources to attack Umuahia after Aba instead of focusing on Uli-Ihiala as ordered by AHQ. In other words, Colonel Adekunle’s Operation “OAU” was fully sanctioned by the C-in-C.



The genesis of the situation described in the last paragraph needs explanation. Nigeria’s first military leader, Major General Ironsi originally formalized the title “Chief of Staff (Army)” [COS (A)] in January 1966 – although plans for such a position were in place before he came to office. Indeed, Colonel Kur Mohammed of blessed memory was the first COS (A) designate. This position did not carry the same weight as the “GOC, Nigerian Army” or the current title “Chief of Army Staff (COAS)”. The COS (A) was basically a Chief Clerk to the C-in-C in charge of Army matters. He did not really “command” the Army – unless his roll seniority level compelled officers to defer to him. Thus the C-in-C (or more correctly, Supreme Commander, as it was known at that time) was the real Army Chief. This was the situation from 1966 until 1975.



Back in July 1967, shortly after the war began, then Chief of Staff (Army), Col. JRI Akahan, had died in a helicopter crash. With the blessing of General Gowon, then GSO (1) at the AHQ, Lt. Col. Iliya Bissala, assumed the position of Acting Chief of Staff (Army). Some observers interpreted this move as an act of nepotism since Bissala was from the same Benue-Plateau State as the C-in-C as well as the immediate past COS (A), Col. Joe Akahan. In fact, with reference to the divisional commanders, Bissala was six months junior to Adekunle and a course-mate at Sandhurst to Shuwa and Murtala Mohammed, all of whom, therefore, decided to ignore him and deal with the C-in-C directly. Indeed, some other staff and ‘general pool’ officers in the AHQ at that time were senior to Bissala. They included Lt. Col. Oluwole Rotimi, Brigadiers David Ejoor, Emmanuel Ekpo and Hassan Katsina, among others. For different reasons, Brigadiers Ogundipe and Adebayo, both combatants, were assigned non-regimental duties. To compound matters, the man who replaced Bissala as the GSO (1) at AHQ was none other than Lt. Col. Sule Apollo, who had just been relieved of his position for alleged “ineffectiveness” as Commander of 1 Sector in the 1st Division by Colonel Shuwa. Between Bissala and Apollo, therefore, AHQ was a ‘no go area’ for the Divisional Commanders – until Lt. Col. James Oluleye became GSO (1) in November 1967 and Brigadier Hassan Usman Katsina took over as COS (A) in January 1968.

OFFLINE

CONCLUSION



Among the many Federal Nigerian military disasters of the civil war, the siege of Owerri embodies many lessons of war and peace, man management in crisis and the endurance of the human spirit, viewed from both Nigerian and Biafran perspectives in that tragic conflict. It is a fascinating story that I hope will someday be the subject of memorialization, simulated war games, a book, and perhaps even a movie.



This story began with a review of military disasters in history and is one of several in the Nigerian Civil war series. We can now safely conclude that incompetent command, failure to plan for trouble, interference by political leadership, misplaced confidence and sheer failure to perform were all factors – among others – in the federal debacle at Owerri in 1968 and 1969. Even then, covered in the ashes of that tactical, operational and strategic disaster, there were heroes.



When men of the 16th Brigade finally linked up with the rest of the 3MCDO at Ohoba, they looked scrawny, bearded, and frazzled – little better than their prisoners of war. But they had broken out of Owerri with their rifles, trucks, field guns and armoured vehicles, and now stood, in uniform, with ranks, behind their surviving non-commissioned and commissioned officers, with Lt. Col. EA Etuk in front and the lifeless body of the late Major Hamman in tow. Battered though they appeared, they still projected the image of an organized fighting unit – one that had earned the eternal respect of their adversaries in combat. As Field Marshall the Viscount Slim recalled about the men of the Burma Corps at Imphal in 1942, “they might look like scarecrows, but they looked like soldiers too.”



In time to come, the 16th Brigade was reinforced, refitted and refurbished, and returned to combat duty near the Ohaji palm plantation and along the Umu Nelu-Umuakpu-Owerri road.

On January 9, 1970, Owerri was captured once again – for the last time, this time in an all out assault by the 12 Brigade under Captain Isemede, 17 Brigade under Major Tomoye and 13 Brigade under Major Innih - and the war brought to an end.



It is to the memory of all that perished – on both sides - during the siege of Owerri that this article was dedicated.





APPENDIX



Notes on key commanders during the siege of Owerri



FEDERAL NIGERIAN SIDE



Colonel E.A. Etuk (rtd)



Throughout this essay I have referred to this fine officer as “Etuk.” In some publications he is referred to as “Utuk” but I have used “Etuk” because that is what was used in the most recent official Army publication on the Civil War. Colonel EA Etuk (rtd) [N415] was admitted to the “Boys Company” (Nigerian Military School) in 1954 at age 14. In 1958, he graduated from NMS and was a soldier at the officer preparatory school at Apapa in Lagos. He was selected for further officer cadet training at Fort Dix in New Jersey, followed by six months of cavalry and armored training at Fort Knox in Kentucky, both in the United States – as part of the USAAF Officer Leadership Training program of that era. He was commissioned Second Lieutenant in June 1963, underwent further training and was welcomed home in 1964 by then Defence Minister, Alhaji Muhammadu Ribadu.



Etuk served as a subaltern in the 4th Battalion at Ibadan under the late Lt. Col. Abogo Largema. As a Captain he was deployed to the 2nd Brigade at Apapa under the late Brigadier Zakaria Maimalari. During the count down to the war he rejected an invitation by Colonel Effiong to return to the eastern region to fight under Ojukwu. He was subsequently a staff officer (operations), charged with weapons acquisition under Lt. Col. Iliya Bissala at AHQ and went on arms purchasing missions abroad for Nigeria at the onset of the civil war. In October 1967, Lt. Col. Bissala prevented then Lt. Col. Murtala Mohammed from drafting Etuk to the 2nd Division for the disastrous Onitsha assault river crossing. However, he was later literally “hijacked” by Lt. Col. B.A.M. Adekunle and deployed to the 3rd Division as the Officer Commanding the 8 Battalion in Calabar. After battalion operations in the Calabar-Itu-Ikot-Ekpene axis he was redeployed to Port Harcourt as Commander, 16 Brigade. As a Field Major, he took part in the successful 3MCDO campaign for Port Harcourt along with officers like Lt. Col. Filemon Shande, Lt. Col. Pius Eromobor, Major George Innih, and (initially) Adaka Boro, among others.



After the fall of Port Harcourt, Etuk was tasked (as a Field Lt. Col.) with the capture of Owerri as part of “Operation OAU”.



As the commander of the subsequently beleaguered 16th Brigade, he emerged among all the Nigerian field commanders of the civil war as the most highly thought of by his Biafran opponents. According to Madiebo,



“….. the enemy force at Owerri which was the [16] Brigade under a young Calabar officer called Utuk [Etuk], was easily the best fighting unit fielded by Nigeria throughout the war. Right from Port Harcourt, and particularly at Afam, it had become obvious that the Brigade was a force well led. Inside Owerri, they fought with extraordinary courage, flexibility and determination. The withdrawal of the Brigade from Owerri was tactically tidy and well planned and executed. Without doubt no other Nigerian Brigade could have withstood for more than a month the punishment the enemy [16] Brigade absorbed with patience for over four months. Only that Brigade could have got out of Owerri under the circumstances.”



After the Owerri debacle, Lt. Col. Etuk was temporarily appointed Garrison Commander for Port Harcourt before returning to command the newly reinvigorated 16 Brigade under t

OFFLINE

OWERRI, 1969 [APPENDIX - CONTINUED]



Notes on key commanders during the siege of Owerri


BIAFRAN PERSONALITIES DURING THE SIEGE OF OWERRI (continued)


Former Lt. Col. Ogbugo Kalu [Biafran Brigadier]



Ex-Biafran Brigadier Ogbugo Kalu, commander of the Biafran 14 Division during the siege of Owerri joined the Nigerian Army in September 1958. After training at the ROSTS (Ghana) and MONS Officer Cadet School (UK), he was short service commissioned 2/Lt. in November 1959. Like his colleagues of that era, he rose rapidly and was already a substantive Major by May 1966 when Major General Ironsi promoted him Acting Lt. Col. He saw action as an infantry officer during the Cameroon uprising and served with UN peace-keeping troops in the Congo. At the time of the northern counter-coup of July 1966 he was the Commandant of the Nigerian Military training College (NMTC) in Kaduna, as the successor to Colonel Ralph Shodeinde who had been assassinated in January. (Kalu was neither informed nor did he take part in the January 1966 coup.)



On July 29, 1966, as conditions in Kaduna became increasingly tense following reports of the northern counter-coup in the south, he hosted an early afternoon meeting at his house in Kaduna of a few officers who were concerned about their safety. These officers included Lt. Col. Madiebo, and Majors Emelifonwu, Ogunro and Ogbemudia. Ogunro and Emelifonwu were later killed. Kalu eventually slipped out of Northern Nigeria and, as Madiebo was to do subsequently, escaped to eastern Nigeria in the water-tank of a Goods Train.



In early February 1967, the then eastern region government, concerned about the gathering clouds of confrontation decided to create two new infantry battalions that would not be under the control of the federal government. These were the 7th and 8th battalions. Lt. Col. Ogbugo Kalu was asked to command the 8th battalion based at Port Harcourt while Madiebo was in command of the 7th, based at Nsukka. The 8th Bn was initially responsible for Ahoada, Calabar, Oron and Bonny. By the time war actually broke out on July 6th, a new 9th Bn (under Biafran Major Ogbo Oji) was in the process of being formed at Calabar. 52 Brigade was then created – to include the 8th and 9th Battalions, initially under Colonel Eze. Kalu later took command of this Brigade after further differentiation. He was, therefore, in command of unsuccessful efforts by 52 Bde to resist Colonel Adekunle’s landing at Bonny in July 1967. However, Kalu nearly recaptured Bonny in December 1967 and January 1968 from the federal 15 Brigade under Lt. Col. Julius Alani Akinrinade. Akinrinade had transferred to the 3MCDO from 2DIV after falling out with Col. Murtala Mohammed over the Onitsha disaster. But he then got into a disaster of his own and was barely saved at Bonny by timely reinforcements from Lagos. (It was during this operation that Lt. Col. Onifade died)



Again, in late March and early April, after a series of reversals, Kalu blocked the first major attempt by Adekunle to take Port Harcourt through Onne. Akinrinade’s 15 brigade was practically wiped out. According to Oluleye, the only survivors were “Ijaw swimmers” who knew how to disappear into the creeks. If Kalu had sustained the momentum and conducted a hot pursuit he would have retaken Bonny and made history.



Unfortunately for Kalu, local Biafran civilian leaders were frustrated with his inability to stem the overall tide of Adekunle’s subsequent advance on Port Harcourt. Therefore, in an atmosphere rife with unnecessary suspicions of sabotage, he was replaced in late April as Brigade Commander initially by then Major Joe “Hannibal” Achuzia of Abagana fame and subsequently by Navy Captain Anuku. This did not, however, stop Adekunle from eventually taking the city via other axes the following month – in what was clearly a major military disaster for the Biafran military.



After the Port Harcourt debacle, Kalu led the 63 Brigade of the 11 Division under Colonel Amadi and staged a successful assault crossing of the River Niger. He slipped behind 2 Division lines and temporarily harassed Asaba, Ogwashi-Uku and even Ibusa, all in the Midwest. The significance of this move was that it was the first return of Biafran units to the Midwest since they were evicted in October 1967. Unsurprisingly, the incursion was not significantly publicized on the federal side.



In September 1968, as elements of the 3MCDO were linking Aba to Owerri during the opening phases of Operation OAU, Ojukwu relieved then 14 Division Commander, Colonel Nwajei and placed Colonel Kalu in charge – with the initial task of defending Mbaise against the federal 14th Brigade. Although unfairly needled by Ojukwu about his problems at Port Harcourt, he subsequently led the Biafran double envelopment of the federal 16th Brigade at Owerri, which – under Madiebo’s supervision - he recaptured in April 1969. As a result, he was promoted to the rank of Brigadier.



Brigadier Kalu was still in command of the 14 Division when Owerri was taken back, this time, finally, in January 1970, during ‘Operation Tail-Wind’, the final federal offensive of the war. He was among the officers who accompanied Biafran Major General Phillip Effiong to Amichi, and later Owerri for the military surrender to Colonel Olusegun Obasanjo in the field after the broadcast of January 12, 1970.



Biafran Colonel Joe “Hannibal” Achuzia (rtd)



Biafran Colonel Joseph Oseloka Achuzia (rtd) (a.k.a. “Hannibal”, “Air Raid”) never served in the Nigerian Army. For that reason there are no Nigerian Army records in his name. He did write a book titled, “Requiem Biafra” (Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1986).



He says he originally served as a conscript in the British Army in Korea under the assumed name “George Taylor.” However, Commonwealth war records that I have reviewed identify “George Taylor” as Brigadier George Taylor, Brigade Commander of the 28th British Commonwealth Brigade - one of the two Brigades in the Commonwealth division during the Korean War. ‘George Taylor’ was definitely a Caucasian. But it is possible that Achuzia may have served under him as a black man with the exact same name.



Be that as it may, Achuzia returned to Nigeria on July 29, 1966 as elements of the 2nd Battalion at Ikeja Barracks were closing down the Ikeja International airport in Lagos during the early stages of the northern counter-coup. With the assistance of coup leader Lt. Col. Murtala Mohammed (whom he knew personally), Achuzia and his expatriate wife were given safe passage to Benin City (capital of his home region), from where he later made his way to Port Harcourt. It was after he returned that he re-assumed his ancestral Asaba family name.



When the war broke out he joined the Biafran Militia. As a militiaman he played an active role in the August 1967 Biafran invasion of his home region in the Midwest. In fact he was involved in the arrest of several Biafran officers (like 101 Division Chief of Staff Major [Lt. Col.] Adewale Ademoyega) in that theater after suspicion fell upon them for alleged sabotage. He later claimed command of the “Republic of Benin Division” after Colonel Banjo was withdrawn, tried and later shot by Ojukwu. Along with other Biafran elements, he fell back across the river Niger Bridge in the wake of Lt. Col. Mohammed’s rapid advance.



As a volunteer militiaman, Achuzia was very active in the defence of Onitsha. After the heroic defence of Onitsha against the initial efforts of Colonel Murtala Mohammed to take it across the Niger, fellow Midwesterner, Brigadier Nwawo, who was then 11 Division Commander, recommended that Achuzia be commissioned. He was inducted into the Biafran Army with the rank of a Major – in a move Madiebo calls “the greatest mistake of my military career.” Achuzia proved to be an expert in publicity stunts – and had very poor relationship with officers who had been conventionally trained in military academies. There is no doubt, however, that he was quite useful to Ojukwu in keeping the regular military boys “in line.” He was an absolute gem for Biafran propaganda.



Just before Onitsha eventually fell in early 1968 (to then Major Shehu Musa Yar’Adua), civilian militia elements moved in to take control of some regular army formations. Citing his Korean War experience, Achuzia lobbied for, and was appointed the Division Operations Officer for the Biafran 11 Division, previously commanded by Colonel Nwawo. In this position he was technically the Divisional Commander – an appointment he attained within three months of being commissioned into the Biafran Army. Achuzia had direct reporting relationship with the Head of State, Ojukwu, thus bypassing the Biafran Army HQ. His new Administrative Officer was none other than Brigadier Nwawo – his former Divisional Commander (and one time Nigerian Defence Attache in London)!